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SUMMARY 
During the 1990s, the Governments of Peru and the United States established a 
counternarcotics air interdiction program called Air Bridge Denial over the Peruvian Amazon.  
During this program the United States Central Intelligence Agency conducted surveillance 
missions over Peru’s coca growing regions, and passed suspicious aircraft location data to the 
Peruvian Air Force, who would then intercept the suspected narcotrafficking aircraft and force 
them to land or be shot down.  The program was interrupted in 2001 following the accidental 
shootdown of a missionary floatplane over Peru, which resulted in the deaths of two United 
States citizens.  This thesis examines the development, operations, and fallout of Air Bridge 
Denial in Peru, including its patterns of errors, complexities and challenges such as binational 
interoperability, bilingual communications failures, neglect of mandatory protocols, and poor 
oversight.  In examining the detailed history of Air Bridge Denial, this thesis strives to present 
lessons learned for the development and implementation of any similar programs in the future. 
Disclaimer: The views in this paper are strictly those of the author, and do not necessarily 
reflect the official views of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its 
agencies, nor the Olmsted Foundation. Moreover, all of the government sources used for this 
thesis are from open source and unclassified public archives, and from sources readily available 
to the public through open web searches and periodicals, including documents released under the 
U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  This is in fact an admitted limitation to the study, as 
there may be additional government information, included classified archives, from both the U.S. 
and Peru that might provide greater detail and insight. The author does not know this to be a fact 
or not. The publicly available information at hand may at least help fill gaps in the historical 
academic record surrounding the program, and open the door for continued study on the topic. 
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WORDS OF APPRECIATION 
It is not enough to know one’s own strengths, weaknesses, and general characteristics. 
The solutions of difficulties that arise between nations require a knowledge and depth of 
understanding of the particular nations involved. 
-General George Olmsted
First and foremost, I would like to thank the Olmsted Scholar Program, the Foundation 
Officers and Board members, and the United States Air Force for this incredible and generous 
opportunity to live, study, travel, and immerse in Peru and Latin America during these past two 
years.  The culmination of this thesis is the result of my searching for new perspectives and a 
deeper understanding of complexities in our world, and follows General Olmsted’s belief that 
effective leaders must be educated broadly.   
Of course, I would like to thank the PUCP professors, staff, and classmates for their 
outstanding academic professionalism, encouragement, and patience these past two years, 
particularly in the Masters of History program.  Thank for welcoming me into the PUCP 
community and for sharing your perspectives and kindness with me throughout.  
I also express my sincere gratitude to my thesis advisors, Professors Víctor Torres Laca 
and Sandro Patrucco Núñez, for their helpful critiques, resources, and thoughtful 
recommendations throughout the thesis research and writing process.  Moreover, I truly 
appreciate my fellow thesis seminarians for their helpful inputs and challenging questions 
throughout this investigation. 
Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my family and dear friends, both in the 
United States and Peru, specifically my wife, Lauren, for her daily encouragement, partnership, 
and support throughout this challenging and enriching program.  Thank you, mi amor.  
7	
INTRODUCTION 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the United States government instituted drug interdiction 
programs through Latin America in an effort to combat the flow of narcotics.  These interdiction 
efforts were part of the United States broader “War on Drugs,” a term famously coined by 
President Richard Nixon in 1971, during which he called drug use a national emergency and 
"public enemy number one.”1 These U.S. counternarcotics efforts escalated under Presidents 
Reagan and George H.W. Bush, becoming formalized with a focus on the production and 
transport of narcotics to the U.S. from Latin America.  One such covert operation, the Air Bridge 
Denial Program (ABDP), was eventually established by the U.S. government in collaboration 
with the governments of Peru and Colombia with the intention of interrupting the air transport of 
coca paste by civilian aircraft flying primarily across remote territory and isolated borders. The 
program called for the utilization of U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
capabilities to detect, analyze and pass aircraft track data to the Peruvian and Colombian Air 
Forces, who would then intercept and force down suspected civilian aircraft carrying 
narcotraffickers and coca paste.  In now-declassified reporting, by 1997 the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) had claimed the ABDP as a “major success that played a key role in 
the significant decline of coca cultivation in Peru and the linchpin of a successful strategy to 
disrupt the export of coca products.”2  In Peru alone, the CIA reported that with its assistance 
between 1995-2001, the Peruvian Air Force (Fuerza Aerea del Peru or FAP) shot down 15 
1 “US government's 'war on drugs'”, The Guardian, July 22, 2011,  
https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2011/jul/22/drugs-trade-richard-nixon 
2 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General Investigations Staff, Report of Investigation: 
Procedures used in Narcotics Airbridge Denial Program in Peru, 1995-2001 (August 25, 2008), 1, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/no-id-present-original-source 
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suspected drug traffickers.3  However, in 2001 the program was abruptly cancelled in Peru 
following the shootdown of a small floatplane carrying five U.S. citizens—a missionary pilot 
Kevin Donaldson and missionary family of passengers, James (“Jim”) and Veronica (“Roni”) 
Bowers, and their two children, Cory, age six, and Charity, age seven months. The shootdown 
resulted in the deaths of Roni Bowers and her infant daughter Charity. The fallout of the 
accidental shootdown led to a string of subsequent government investigations and scrutiny of the 
program, which ultimately exposed a pattern of errors and faults in the program on the part of 
both the U.S. and Peruvian officials involved.   
Utilizing now-declassified U.S. Government documents, correspondence and 
testimonies, including from the CIA, U.S. Department of State (DoS), Government General 
Accounting Office (GAO), and U.S. Congressional and Senate testimonies, along with Peruvian 
decrees, military correspondence, and U.S., Peruvian, and international press reporting, this 
thesis will fill a gap in the academic domain regarding the history of air interdiction in Peru by 
examining the evolution of the ABDP in Peru, the program’s systematic errors and problems that 
led to the accidental loss of civilian life in 2001, and the immediate fallout of the program that 
led to its halting.  Through this study, the paper aims to present lessons learned from the 
historical context of the program in Peru; that is to say, lessons can be and should be learned 
regarding the importance of effective oversight in sensitive programs, military training, systems 
modernization and interoperability, effective communications protocols, including the 
importance of bilingual capabilities, and adherence to legal standards and operating procedures, 
particularly in the face of critical and time-sensitive life or death situations.  
3	The Peruvian government has claimed the forcedown or shootdown of more than 38 aircraft through its air 
interdiction program – however, this thesis specifically examines the 15 shootdowns of the Air Bridge Denial 
Program during the period of 1995-2001, which involved the CIA working closely in coordination with the FAP 
(United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), Review of United States Assistance to Peruvian 
Counter-Drug Air Interdiction Efforts and the Shootdown of a Civilian Aircraft on April 20, 2001 (October 2001), 
10).			
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Even today, as the U.S. has resumed its ABDP with the Government of Colombia, the 
Government of Peru (GOP) is taking measures to reinitiate a similar effort.4 However, the 
historical context and lessons learned from ABDP in Peru must be examined and considered 
before moving forward in developing policy.  As a disclaimer, this thesis does not assign 
culpability by name to any of the crew members intimately involved, whether from Peru or the 
United States.  The Governments of both the United States and Peru conducted joint and internal 
investigations, and subsequent judgments and punishments were given out to certain individuals 
associated with the program.  While this thesis is not a judicial verdict, it seeks to be a whole-
picture analysis and assessment of a program riddled with errors and the tragic inevitability of a 
fatal, and negligent accident to better understand what went wrong along the way.  
4 Agreement Between The Government Of The United States Of America And The Government Of The Republic Of 
Colombia Concerning The Program For The Suppression Of Illicit Aerial Traffic In Narcotic Drugs And 
Psychotropic Substances ("Air Bridge Denial Agreement"), August 25, 2012, https://2009-
2017.state.gov/documents/organization/207579.pdf 
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Figure 1: The Bowers family in Peru circa 2001. The mother, Veronica, and infant daughter, 
Charity, were killed in the 2001 shootdown of their small missionary floatplane piloted by Kevin 
Donaldson.5  
CHAPTER 1. Pre-1994 the history leading to Air Bridge Denial 
1.1. A brief history of coca culture and production in Peru  
The mere mention of the coca plant, Erythroxylon coca, is controversial today for its use 
in the production of the drug cocaine.  However, the use of the coca plant by human beings in 
what would come to be known as modern day South America dates back to as early as 8,000 
years ago. The plant is the center of various indigenous religious myths and rituals going back 
millennia in the region. In fact, the coca plant was ascribed supernatural origins and functions by 
indigenous cultures in the Americas, and set in a sacred and ritualistic sphere within society.  
Additionally, early colonial Spanish chroniclers recount the high value placed on coca leaves by 
5 Photo published in El Comercio, April 24, 2001. 
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the indigenous population, and coca’s role in the Incan empire and Andean life as both a 
commodity and a currency. 6  Now, scientific studies of coca’s medicinal properties have found 
that its leaves contain a powerful alkaloid that acts as a stimulant with effects that include a 
raised heart rate, increased energy, and even the suppression of hunger and thirst.7 Even though 
coca plant cultivation itself has not historically been illegal in Peru (and many people are still 
offered coca tea or coca leaves to combat altitude sickness upon the arrival at the Cusco airport, 
for example), coca paste is the fundamental ingredient to cocaine production.  This key 
relationship of coca cultivation to cocaine production ultimately brought Peru into the modern 
counternarcotics discussion and focus of the War on Drugs. 
Throughout the beginnings of the so-called cocaine epidemic of the 1980s and into the 
early 1990s, Peru was the world’s largest producer of the coca leaf.  By 1992, for example, 
Peruvian coca leaf cultivation peaked at 129,100 hectares and accounted for approximately 61 
percent of the world's coca production.8  Beginning in the 1980s, the coca leaf first went through 
a refinery process in Peru to turn it into coca paste, before being transported to Colombia for 
final processing as the drug cocaine and shipment to the world's markets, primarily northward to 
the U.S.  During those years, the remote jungle region of the Upper Huallaga Valley along the 
6 Tom D. Dillehay, et al. “Early Holocene coca chewing in northern Peru,” Antiquity 84, Issue 326 (25 November 
2010): 939-953, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/antiquity/article/early-holocene-coca-chewing-in-
northern-peru/6452FDEFF4B27959A376256AFCFAEECE  
7 Adriana Baulenas, “Coca: A Blessing and a Curse,” National Geographic History Magazine, 
(November/December 2016): 1-3, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/archaeology-and-history/magazine/2016/11-
12/daily-life-coca-inca-andes-south-america/ 
8 United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), Review of United States Assistance to Peruvian 
Counter-Drug Air Interdiction Efforts and the Shootdown of a Civilian Aircraft on April 20, 2001 (October 2001), 2, 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/10764.pdf. 
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Huallaga River, which then flows into the Marañón and Amazon rivers, was the primary center 
of Peruvian coca cultivation.9   
Due to the remoteness of these jungle cultivation areas, drug traffickers appeared to 
prefer the air transportation of coca product. In fact, owing to to the poorly developed road 
systems in the jungle regions in Peru, and because the navigable rivers do not flow northward 
toward processing facilities in Colombia, the transport of coca paste by air was simply the fastest 
and most efficient method.10  Thus, in order to move the product from Peru to Colombia and 
sometimes Bolivia, a narcotrafficking “air bridge” was created which involved the use of small 
civilian aircraft to go between the countries taking semi-refined coca out of Peru for further 
processing and export through Colombia, with the return trip bringing cash back in to the 
Peruvian narcotraffickers.  In fact, during the 1980s, the U.S. GAO assessed that up to 90 per 
cent of narcotrafficking in the region was occurring via this air bridge.11 At the height of the 
aforementioned narcotrafficking air bridge during 1994, the U.S. detected more than 428 
narcotics flights departing Peru carrying an estimated total of 310 metric tons of semi-refined 
cocaine, with an average load of approximately 724 kilograms per flight. The FAP placed the 
average number of international trafficking aircraft even higher, at up to 270 flights per month.12  
By the mid-1990s, these civilian aircraft flights had clearly emerged as the key mode of illicit 
export of Peruvian coca to outside markets, and the so-called air bridge was identified as the 
9 U.S. SSCI, Review of United States Assistance, 2. 
10 U.S. SSCI, Review of United States Assistance, 8. 
11 United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Peru 
Investigation Report: The April 20, 2001 Peruvian Shootdown Accident (August 2001), 2, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?search&exact=United+States.+Bureau+for+International+Narcotics+and+Law+Enforcement
+Affairs&searchfield=publisher&collection=limited&submitted=Search&advanced=1&release=0
12 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 2.
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critical node in the War on Drugs, and thus, the aerial transport of Peruvian coca became a 
primary target of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in the region.   
1.2. U.S. response to coca production in Peru 
So what was the U.S. response to the coca production and trafficking within and out of 
Peru?  In 1989, President George H. W. Bush outlined his overall counter-drug strategy with a 
focus on both reducing the demand and supply of illicit drugs, including treatment, 
prevention/education, research, law enforcement, and international efforts.  One of the key 
components of this multi-faceted U.S. drug control policy was the Andean Initiative.  The 
Initiative was designed to help the major coca-growing/processing/shipping nations of Bolivia, 
Colombia and Peru “to reduce illicit drug activities.”13 The U.S. strategy included an increase of 
economic, military, and law enforcement assistance to the aforementioned three countries, in 
addition to preferential trade treatment for these same countries. Moreover, in order to formalize 
the initiative, the first Andean drug summit meeting was held on February 15, 1990, in 
Cartagena, Colombia, during which time the governments of the U.S., Bolivia, Colombia, and 
Peru pledged to “cooperate with one another in a concerted attack on every aspect of the drug 
trade and to exchange information on the flows of both precursor chemicals and drug money.”14 
 In accordance with President George H.W. Bush’s drug control efforts, the U.S. 
increased support to Peruvian counternarcotics efforts and deployed U.S. Special Operations 
Forces to the train the Peruvian military in counter-drug operations.15  In addition to funding and 
13 Raphael F. Perl “United States Andean Drug Policy: Background and Issues for Decisionmakers,” Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs Vol. 34, No. 3, Special Issue: Drug Trafficking Research Update (Autumn 
1992): 13. 
14 Perl, “United States Andean Drug Policy,” 17. 
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training Peruvian efforts, the U.S. established a large and multi-pronged counter-drug program in 
Peru based on what it labeled the “four pillars” of drug control: interdiction, eradication, 
alternative development, and demand reduction.16 During that time, most of the sections of the 
U.S. Embassy in Lima contributed to this counternarcotics effort, with the lead agency of 
responsibility being the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), working in coordination with the 
Peruvian National Police.17  
In order to address the specific objective of interdiction, the U.S. began to consider 
methods to interrupt the transport of coca paste by civilian aircraft between Peru other countries 
through the aforementioned air bridge. To that end, the U.S. began consistent aerial monitoring 
of civilian aircraft flying as part of this air bridge in 1990, under the U.S. Southern Command’s 
Operation Support Justice, which also included the participation of the CIA in 1991-1992.18  The 
stated objective of Operation Support Justice was to use ground based radars in Peru along with 
U.S. aerial tracking and surveillance aircraft, such as the U.S. Air Force’s E-3 Sentry Airborne 
Warning and Control System (AWACS) and U.S. Navy P-3 Orion and E-2C Hawkeye, which 
were equipped with high fidelity air detection radars, to confirm local Peruvian law enforcement 
intelligence sources regarding suspected locations and routes of the small civilian aircraft 
operating the air bridge within the region.19 Operation Support Justice provided data on the 
routes being used by trafficking aircraft, the flight times, departure points and final destinations, 
and the U.S. would then pass this information to the appropriate Peruvian civilian and military 
15 Perl, 14. 
16 U.S. SSCI, Review of United States Assistance, 2, including staff interviews with United States Embassy Country 
Team, Lima, Peru, June 21 2001.  
17 U.S. SSCI, Review of United States Assistance, 2. 
18 CIA, Report of Investigation, 3.  
19 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 2. 
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officials and alert them to the ongoing flights and initiate discussions on how these flights might 
be stopped.  Thus, the initial steps in U.S. aerial surveillance were not explicitly interdiction 
missions per se; rather, they were ISR operations intended to bolster Peruvian military and police 
ground operations in the jungle.   
In order to further formalize the aforementioned intelligence sharing between the U.S. 
and Peru, in May 1991 the governments signed a bilateral counternarcotics framework document 
that set the policy stage for all aspects of counternarcotics cooperation, including a reference to 
cooperation against aerial trafficking.20 Moreover, Section B.13 of this bilateral document stated 
in part "the Government of Peru shall propose policies designed to remove incentives for drug 
trafficking. The Government of Peru may also set policies for coordination among the Peruvian 
National Police, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force so as to achieve prompt results in matters 
related to security, controls, interceptions and required seizures."21  
However, during the development of the intelligence gathering and sharing program, the 
U.S. Government expressed concerns over the challenges the GOP faced in efforts to combat 
narcotrafficking.  For example, the U.S. GAO concluded in a 1991 report that: 
It is unlikely that a U.S. counternarcotics strategy would be effective in Peru unless 
significant progress is made in overcoming serious obstacles primarily beyond U.S. 
ability to control, including: (1) difficulties in implementing government control over 
military and police units involved in counternarcotics operations, (2) extensive 
corruption, (3) lack of coordination between the military and police agencies of the host 
nation, (4) lack of control over airports, (5) political instability caused by insurgent 
groups, (5) an economy heavily dependent on coca-leaf production, and (6) human rights 
violations committed by the military and police.22   
20 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 3. 
21 See note above.  
22 U.S. GAO, The Drug War: US Programs in Peru Face Serious Obstacles (report to congressional requesters), 
October 1991, 4-6. 
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These concerns and obstacles were set against a backdrop of internal instability in Peru, with an 
ongoing fight against the Sendero Luminoso (or the Shining Path) and the Movimiento 
Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (or the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement or MRTA) 
terrorist groups, economic depression and hyperinflation, and Peruvian political transition to the 
government of President Alberto Fujimori in 1990.  Most importantly, the concerns outlined by 
the 1991 U.S. GAO report showed the challenges associated with control and coordination of 
forces involved in the drug fight.  This is a point that would continue to show itself as 
problematic throughout ABDP, particularly with the added challenge of bilateral military and 
government agency control and coordination throughout the operations—a factor that would 
ultimately prove fatal in 2001.   
1.3. Peruvian Government Measures 
Initially, under President Alberto Fujimori’s new government and the so-called "Fujimori 
Doctrine," the Peruvian government sought to establish a market economy in coca-growing 
regions, claiming respect for human rights, and attempting to distinguish between the coca leaf 
growers and the drug traffickers.23  The Peruvian government sought to achieve its 
counternarcotics aim by interdicting flights at their points of departure or arrival on the ground 
within Peruvian territory.  These terrestrial counter-trafficking operations consisted of pre-
positioned law enforcement units at clandestine airstrips to catch traffickers loading or unloading 
aircraft on the ground, destroying illicit airstrips with explosives, and intensifying passenger and 
cargo searches of Peruvian aircraft.  According to the U.S. government, this early program had 
23 Ricardo Soberón Garrido “The War on Cocaine in Peru,” The WOLA Briefing Series: Issues in International Drug 
Policy, Issue Brief 6 (7 August 1992): 4, https://www.tni.org/es/node/7383 
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some success at changing narcotrafficking flight patterns, and forced the traffickers to spread out 
their production, relocate, and primarily only fly at night.24   
However, at the same time, along with new ambitious economic and counter-terrorism 
programs, Fujimori’s new government ushered in a striking series of executive decrees, which 
led to a complete reversal in the aforementioned policy.  In June of 1991, Fujimori requested that 
the Peruvian Congress give him the power to legislate on economic issues and to develop a 
comprehensive policy for combating both domestic terrorism and drug trafficking. The 126 
executive decrees, which were subsequently issued in November 1991, laid out the Peruvian 
government's national "pacification" strategy.25 Approximately 30 of these decrees essentially 
granted unlimited powers to the Peruvian armed forces throughout the country to combat 
violence, especially in the designated "emergency zones."  The decrees also strengthened the 
Peruvian military at the expense of human rights protections for civilians, in turn contradicting 
many of the previous principles set forth in the so-called "Fujimori Doctrine."26  
Regarding the counternarcotics efforts, the Fujimori government specifically addressed 
the theme of air interdictions and bestowed responsibility of these operations to the FAP. Under 
Fujimori’s government, Decree Law Number 25426 was passed on April 9, 1992, which first 
declared a state of emergency extending over all airports in the Huallaga Zone and any coca-
producing zone. 27  There were clearly internal political reasons that led this decree to take a 
firmer stance against narcotraffickers, including the powerful state of emergency language 
24 U.S. SSCI, Review of United States Assistance, 3.  
25 Soberón Garrido “The War on Cocaine in Peru,” 6-7. 
26 Soberón Garrido, 6. 
27 Government of Peru, Decreto Ley No. 25426, April 9, 1992, https://www.deperu.com/legislacion/derogada-
decreto-ley-n-25426.html 
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included in the text.  This decree by Fujimori was part of a larger internal government shift in 
Peru, and was issued just four days after the famous Peruvian “autogolpe” or self-imposed coup 
d’etat on April 5, 1992, during which Fujimori announced he was “temporarily dissolving” the 
Congress of the Republic and "reorganizing" the Judicial Branch of the government, and 
suspending much of the Constitution—a move that at the time had an overwhelming majority of 
support among the Peruvian public, in light of the ongoing violence and economic hardships.28 
With Fujimori’s emergency measures and executive powers in place, the Decree Law Number 
25426 authorized the FAP to take control of all airports and airfields in the Upper Huallaga 
Valley and any other areas associated with narcotrafficking, and to take “adequate measures” to 
destroy runways used by traffickers was part of new hard-line approach by the Peruvian 
executive to apply “drastic punishments" towards terrorists.29  
As a result of the autogolpe and the subsequent executive decrees, in the Upper Huallaga 
Valley alone the FAP had established 16 "aeronautical control bodies" at airports and airfields, 
which were tasked to review aircraft flight plans in and out of local airports, enforce evening 
flying curfews, and monitor flying times for domestic flights in order to ensure that there were 
no unknown or illicit flights.30  Moreover, Article 4 of the Decree Law Number 25426 stated that 
the FAP would intercept both national and foreign aircraft flying above the coca growing zones, 
at which point the aircraft would have to identify themselves and their flight path.  Article 4 then 
went on to state that, should intercepted aircraft fail to comply with the FAP’s requested 
information, the FAP would take “appropriate measures” including the possible downing of 
28 Gustavo Pastor, “Los veinte años del ‘autogolpe’ de Fujimori: el surgimiento del ‘fujimorismo,’” SciencesPo, 
Amerique Latine Political Outlook, 2012, 
http://www.sciencespo.fr/opalc/sites/sciencespo.fr.opalc/files/Fujimori%20P%C3%A9rou.pdf.  
29 Government of Peru, Decreto Ley No. 25426, April 9, 1992. 
30 Decreto Ley No. 25426 
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aircraft.31  This strongly hinted at the use of weapons against narcotrafficking civil aircraft under 
restricted conditions and in conformity with the Peruvian Civil Aeronautics Law and the 
international procedures for interception established by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO).32 
Almost immediately it appeared likely that Fujimori’s autogolpe and new hard-line 
measures might affect relations with the United States.  A couple months earlier, the February 
1992 San Antonio Summit on drugs, attended by the original members from Bush’s Andean 
Initiative, plus Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela, had already stressed relations between the U.S. 
and Peru, as the Fujimori government publicly criticized the U.S. DEA of corruption and 
complicity in the war on drugs.33  On April 6, 1992, the day after Fujimori’s famous autogolpe 
declaration on national television, the U.S. government decided to “suspend immediately all new 
assistance to Peru and to review all of its assistance to that country.”34 As a result, the U.S. 
government froze some $30 million in economic aid and $15 million in military aid slated for 
Peru that had not yet been given for 1991.  The U.S. also froze a further $100 million slated for 
economic aid and $39 million for military aid due to be granted to Peru in 1992.35 Additionally, 
on April 14, nine days after the autogolpe, the Bush administration withdrew the approximately 
20 U.S. Army Special Forces troops from their military training and support role in Peru. Of 
note, despite freezing significant military and economic aid, the Bush administration did 
31 Decreto Ley No. 25426 
32	Government of Peru,	Ley Nº 24882, Ley de Aeronáutica Civil del Perú, 1988.	
33 Cynthia McClintock and Fabian Vallas, The United States and Peru: Cooperation – At A Cost, (London: 
Routledge, 2003), 116.  
34 Thomas L. Friedman, “U.S. is Shunning Sanctions Against Peru” The New York Times, April 14, 1992, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/14/world/us-is-shunning-sanctions-against-peru.html 
35 McClintock and Vallas, The United States and Peru, 118. 
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maintain its humanitarian aid ($120 million) and most of the aid earmarked for narcotics 
control.36  While it appeared the U.S. wanted to stay somewhat involved in the Peruvian 
counternarcotics fight, the government appeared hesitant in growing its partnership considering 
Fujimori’s new aggressive and autocratic posturing. 
1.4. Further Complications: Peru Attacks a U.S. C-130 
To further complicate diplomatic relations between the two countries and 
counternarcotics efforts, a couple weeks after Fujimori’s autogolpe, on April 24, 1992, Peruvian 
Su-22 jets attacked a U.S. Air Force C-130H aircraft approximately 60 nautical miles off the 
northern coast of Peru, resulting in one U.S. crewmember being killed, four crewmembers 
injured, and an emergency landing by the C-130 at the Peruvian airport of Talara.37  The chain of 
events provides a glimpse at the complications presented by binational operations and sensitive 
counter-drug operations, especially considering bilingual communication problems.   
According to U.S. officials, the C-130H ISR aircraft had been flying a counter-drug 
intelligence collection mission over the Upper Huallaga Valley, including taking aerial 
photographs of cocaine labs and narcotrafficking airstrips.  This ISR operation by the 430th 
Reconnaissance Technical Group, under the name Operation Furtive Bear, was a subset of U.S. 
Southern Command’s ongoing broader Operation Support Justice efforts.38  While the 
Pentagon’s official account is that the C-130’s precise purpose had been “approved by the two 
Governments,” the FAP tells a different side to the story—that the unidentified aircraft was 
36 McClintock and Vallas, 118. 
37 Nathaniel C. Nash, “Peru Jets Attack United States Air Transport,” New York Times, April 26, 1992, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/26/world/peru-jets-attack-us-air-transport.html  
38 History Office, XVIII Airborne Corps and Joint Task Force South: OPERATION JUST CAUSE, 
https://history.army.mil/documents/panama/taskorg.htm 
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unresponsive, and was flying over an unauthorized airspace zone.39  Moreover, the FAP stated 
that when the C-130 was intercepted by the FAP’s Su-22 jets from El Pato Airbase, it could have 
responded via radio or landed to identify itself, and that the Su-22s took every appropriate 
measure to provide warnings to the C-130.40  However, apparently in accordance with U.S. 
intelligence flight procedures and sensitive protocols from the Cold War, the U.S. ISR asset was 
not permitted to communicate, fearing possible discovery of classified intelligence capabilities.41 
Thus, instead of responding to the FAP’s requests for identification, the C-130 crew instead 
quickly pulled in its ISR sensors and began to depart Peruvian airspace.  According to a U.S. 
Pentagon spokesperson after the event, the C-130 was returning to its base at Howard Air Force 
Base in Panama (of note, it had stopped on its way down to Peru to refuel at Guayaquil, 
Ecuador).42  
To further complicate the situation, the only communications network that the U.S. had 
established to potentially contact the Peruvian officials was a convoluted and lengthy process, 
which further foreshadowed the binational communications problems of ABDP to come.  In an 
attempt to establish contact, the C-130 radioed the U.S. Southern Command's Joint 
Reconnaissance Center at Howard Air Base, Panama, which in turn called the Southern Region 
Operations Center that actually controlled counternarcotics aerial surveillance missions in Latin 
America.  In turn, the Southern Region Operations Center, also in Panama, then radioed one of 
the joint radar stations in northern Peru, at Yurimaguas.  However, bilingual Spanish-English 
39 A Spy Mission Gone Wrong” Newsweek Magazine, May 30, 1993. https://www.newsweek.com/spy-mission-
gone-wrong-193254, and “FAP agotó toda forma de aviso antes de disparar contra el avión de EE.UU.,” La 
República, April 26, 1992. 
40 See note above. 
41 “A Spy Mission Gone Wrong” Newsweek Magazine, May 30, 1993. https://www.newsweek.com/spy-mission-
gone-wrong-193254 
42 See note above, and “Hercules derribado no era de la DEA,” La República, April 29, 1992. 
22	
barriers and interconnected communications proved challenging, and according to government 
documents following the event, the only Spanish-speaking U.S. military representative at the 
Yurimaguas radar site was a U.S. guard who was off duty at that time.43  Peruvian officers at 
Santa Lucia radioed their Lima headquarters to warn that an unidentified “cargo plane had been 
spotted.”44 Although a U.S. official was sitting in the Lima FAP headquarters as a liaison officer 
for potential binational air coordination, he was not consulted about the identity of the aircraft.45  
Meanwhile, the C-130 flew out 60 nautical miles off the Peruvian coast, and the pilot 
began northward toward Panama, assuming he had safely departed Peru's 12 nautical mile 
international airspace limit.  However, the U.S. Air Force pilot did not know that Peru actually 
claimed up to 200 nautical miles off its coast as sovereign territory, and the Su-22s continued 
their pursuit out over the Pacific Ocean.46 According to a chronology of the event, at 
approximately 4:58 p.m. local time, two Peruvian Su-22 fighters intercepted the C-130, and the 
U.S. crew visually observed the FAP jets rocking their wings, the international signal for "you 
have been intercepted, follow me."47  According to the Pentagon, the C-130 pilots tried to 
communicate with the intercepting Peruvian fighters on the radio frequencies reserved for 
international distress signals.  However, the Peruvian pilots were not tuned to those specific 
frequencies—instead only listening in to their national frequencies.  The C-130 then radioed its 
43 See note above. 
44 See note above. 
45 See note above. 
46 Per the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), every state has the right to establish 
the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles; however, in the case of Peru, since 
1947 the national claim extends to 200 nautical miles, which has been a point of international contention for fishing 
rights and airspace control.  (J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims (Leiden: Nijhoff, 
2012), 353-355).  
47 “A Spy Mission Gone Wrong,” Newsweek Magazine. 
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headquarters in Panama, but the pilot was given orders by U.S. officials to “ignore the Peruvians 
and head north.”48 
Seeing that the U.S. aircraft was not responding, and not receiving any sort of radio 
response, the Peruvian jets proceeded to fire several 30-mm rounds at the C-130, which blew a 
hole in the body of the aircraft and decompressed the cabin.  During the attack, U.S. Air Force 
crewmember Sergeant Joseph Beard was sucked out of the C-130 without a parachute at 
approximately 18,500 feet above sea level and his body was never found.  The C-130 headed for 
the Peruvian coast, while the FAP Su-22s passed by for two more firing runs, leading to an 
explosion in the C-130’s rear cargo compartment.49  The C-130, already punctured by multiple 
rounds of ammunition, with its fuel tanks leaking, an engine destroyed and three flat tires, made 
an emergency landing at Talara on the Peruvian coast. Upon landing, the U.S. crew reported that 
Peruvian military personnel encircled the C-130.  According to a U.S. Embassy statement later, 
the Peruvian base commander, Colonel Carlos Portillo Vasquez, left "no doubt" that his pilots 
already knew they had shot at a U.S. aircraft.50   
So what then was the disconnect regarding the identity of the C-130? How could the FAP 
claim that it did not know the identity of the C-130?  According to the Pentagon, prior to the 
mission, the crew and U.S. military authorities understood they had authorization of the GOP for 
the C-130’s counter-drug operations.51  The Pentagon claimed that the U.S. Air Force had 
received Peruvian Government approval for that specific flight two days before it took place, 
48 A Spy Mission Gone Wrong,” Newsweek Magazine. 
49 See note above.  
50 See note above.  
51 Peruvian shooting of U.S. aircraft caused by miscommunication,” United Press International, December 14, 
1992, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1992/12/14/Peruvian-shooting-of-US-aircraft-caused-by-
miscommunication/3283724309200/ 
24	
which followed the standard procedures agreed upon by the two countries—that flight approval 
had to be obtained at least 24 hours before any mission.52  U.S. officials had understood the 
earlier notice to mean that the notification requirement was already satisfied.  However, a post-
incident investigation revealed that the Peruvian side had apparently expected the flight to be 
reconfirmed at the 24-hour deadline. When that did not happen, the FAP concluded the original 
scheduled flight had been cancelled.53 After the intercept, the FAP released a statement, 
Comunicado 008-92, saying that two FAP aircraft intercepted an unidentified C-130 aircraft 
without a flight plan in an unauthorized zone approximately 80 miles southwest of Talara.54   
In order to explain the shootdown, at first Peruvian military officials said the Su-22 pilots 
could not have known the plane was a U.S. asset, pointing out that the aircraft’s black USAF 
letters were not clearly visible, the aircraft did not have a clear registration number, or visible 
U.S. flag on the tail, and that the plane did not respond to warnings (see Figure 2).55  Moreover, 
the FAP stated the C-130s flight path was “suspicious” and the Su-22 FAP pilots claimed they 
believed the military aircraft was instead a narcotrafficker, and maintained they had acted 
professionally and in accordance with ICAO procedures.56  Some Peruvian military officials 
even suggested conspiracies of secret U.S. operations, based on the aircraft’s paint scheme and 
lack of insignia, suggesting that perhaps the aircraft was itself even carrying cocaine.57  President 
52 “A Spy Mission Gone Wrong,” Newsweek Magazine. 
53 See note above. 
54 “FAP agotó toda forma de aviso,” La República, April 26, 1992. 
55 “Avion norteamericano no tenia permiso para sobrevolar las costas de Talara,” La República, April 27, 1992, and 
“Hercules derribado no era de la DEA,” La República, April 29, 1992. 
56 Nash, “Peru Jets Attack United States Air Transport,” The New York Times, April 26, 1992, and “Hercules 
derribado no era de la DEA,” La República, April 29, 1992. 
57 “Hercules derribado no era de la DEA,” La República, April 29, 1992. 
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Fujimori publicly said that the U.S. Air Force plane was flying without an approved flight plan 
and did not bear the U.S. flag when Peruvian fighter aircraft fired on it.58 A FAP spokesman said 
the American plane had veered 300 miles off its scheduled course and ignored repeated radio 
messages, visual signals, and warning shots.59  Regardless of the apparent difficulty in positively 
identifying the C-130 a U.S. military aircraft, the Su-22s had repeatedly fired upon the target 
well into international airspace.   
From the other perspective, U.S. officials, including the U.S. Ambassador in Lima at the 
time, Anthony Quainton, said the flight had been planned and coordinated in advance, and the C-
130 was in fact an “identified” flight, and they disputed the FAP version by adding that 
narcotraffickers had not been observed using this type of cargo aircraft.60  Moreover, some 
Pentagon officials even went as far as to speculate that the Peruvians fired because they 
suspected the U.S. of spying on secret dealings between corrupt Peruvian military officers and 
traffickers.61 In fact, U.S. officials involved in the counternarcotics missions had reported that 
Peruvian military officials had developed relationships with narcotraffickers around this time.62 
Ambassador Quainton called President Fujimori, and according to a U.S. Embassy spokesman 
and Peruvian press reporting, Fujimori expressed "regret and concern" over the event, apologized 
58 Adriana Von Hagen, “Attacked Plane Had No U.S. Flag, Fujimori Says: Peru: Officials insist that fired-on C-130 
ignored repeated radio and visual warnings,” LA Times, April 26, 1992, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-
1992-04-26-mn-1533-story.html, and “FAP agotó toda forma de aviso,” La República, April 26, 1992. 
59 Nash, “Peru Jets Attack.”  
60 “Avión norteamericano no tenía permiso,” La República. 
61 Newsweek, “A Spy Mission Gone Wrong”; however, this conspiratorial view was likely not the motivating factor, 
and the attack was probably the combined product of miscommunication and increased stresses with the new state of 
emergency decrees by the Fujimori government (McClintock and Vallas, 117).   
62 Stephen G. Trujillo, “Corruption and Cocaine in Peru,” The New York Times, April 7, 1992, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/07/opinion/corruption-and-cocaine-in-peru.html  
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for the incident, and promised a thorough investigation by Peruvian officials.63  However, while 
Peruvian press reports said Fujimori had called President Bush to apologize, the White House 
said the two had not spoken about the incident.64  Regardless of the specific details of an official 
apology or not, the Peruvian press acknowledged that the incident came at a time of tense 
relations for the two countries following Fujimori’s autogolpe, and caused a public dispute 
between the two governments, including an argument over who would pay compensation to the 
family of Sergeant Beard, the deceased U.S. crewmember.65 Additionally, the Peruvian 
government sent a $20,000 bill to the U.S. Embassy demanding payment for the care and 
medical treatment of the wounded C-130 crewmembers after landing near Talara.66  Meanwhile, 
the FAP Su-22 pilots were apparently awarded air medals for their actions in the intercept, which 
further frustrated some in the U.S. Government.67   
While there was much speculation and even conspiracy surrounding the details, 
reasoning, and failures of the intercept, the tragic event was likely due to a myriad of factors, 
including the newly issued Decree Law Number 25426 by Fujimori’s government just two weeks 
earlier.  This likely caused the FAP to be more aggressive in its posture toward all suspected 
aircraft.  While it was known that U.S. aircraft conducted ISR missions in the Upper Huallaga 
Valley in coordination with the DEA and Peruvian counternarcotics operations, the recent 
Peruvian change in FAP interdiction authorities likely created confusion in the chain of 
command under a heightened posture.  The U.S. crew also neglected (or missed) signals by the 
63 “FAP agotó toda forma de aviso,” La República. 
64 “FAP derriba avión de EE.UU. en las costas de Talara,” La República, April 25, 1992, and Nash, “Peru Jets 
Attack.”  
65 “FAP agoto toda forma de aviso,” La Republica. 
66 McClintock and Vallas, 117. 
67 See note above.  
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FAP jets to land, and proceeded with its flight path as ordered and per its regulations to protect 
its sensitive intelligence capabilities.   
Additionally, as would be the case in the 2001 shootdown of the missionary floatplane, 
there was clearly a language barrier and lack of multilingual officials involved in air operations, 
considering the binational counternarcotics coordination that was ongoing.  This is illustrated by 
the lack of Spanish speakers across multiple U.S. military organizations at the time.  In fact, 
following a joint investigation with the Peruvian government, the U.S. military even officially 
publicly acknowledged a mutual lack of understanding of language.68  With the multiple layers 
of miscommunication, the 1992 incident demonstrated there were already troubling military 
coordination issues between the two governments, and this case of confusion in the air and 
aggressive posturing, would come back to prove fatal once again in the 2001 missionary plane 
shootdown, and ultimately the end of ABDP in Peru.  
Figure 2: Photos of the U.S. C-130 aircraft at Talara Airport following the downing by the FAP 
Su-22s, as published in the Peruvian newspaper La República, which show the paint scheme.69 
68 “Peruvian shooting of U.S. aircraft caused by miscommunication,” United Press International, December 14, 
1992, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1992/12/14/Peruvian-shooting-of-US-aircraft-caused-by-
miscommunication/3283724309200/ 
69 Nelson Vela, “El caso del avión de EE.UU. derribado,” La República, April 29, 1992.	
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CHAPTER 2. Pause, re-evaluation, and formalization of Air Bridge Denial 
2.1. United States Legal Concerns and Measures 
Following the 1992 C-130 incident, and despite the public political dispute regarding the 
attack, the U.S. continued its counternarcotics aerial surveillance operations with Peru.70  Behind 
the scenes it appeared there were already plans to actually increase counter-drug cooperation 
with the Fujimori government.71  By September 1992, the two governments had agreed to new 
measures intended to prevent future accidental shootdowns, and by January 1993, the U.S. had 
returned with aerial surveillance missions over the Upper Huallaga Valley.72  Additionally, in the 
U.S. a new Peruvian administration meant a shift in its foreign policy.  In 1993, President Bill 
Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 14 (PD-14) shifting the focus of U.S. counter-
drug efforts from the transit zone in the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico to the source zone, 
chiefly Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.73 As a result, the U.S. stepped up its assistance to Peru in 
1993, as the GOP continued to implement the aforementioned Peruvian Decree Law Number 
25426, which contemplated the use of deadly force against aircraft engaged in drug trafficking.74 
Also in 1993, under the aforementioned Operation Support Justice, the U.S. continued to pass 
aircraft and ground-based ISR data to the FAP, which would the attempt to force the suspected 
narcotics trafficking aircraft to land.75  Because FAP aircraft were not equipped with their own 
70 “EE.UU. no ha suspendido su apoyo aéreo al Perú para lucha contra narcotráfico,” La Republica, April 28, 1992. 
71 Cornelius Freisendorf, US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs (London: Routledge, 2007), 94. 
72 Freisendorf, US Foreign Policy, 95.  
73 U.S. Congress, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, House Report 104-486: National Drug Policy: 
A Review Of The Status Of The Drug War (19 March 1996), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd14_house.htm 
74 U.S. SSCI, Review of United States Assistance, 3. 
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radar, they relied on track data collected by U.S. aircraft and radar sites to locate suspicious 
aircraft.  
Following increased pushes by the Clinton Administration under Operation Support 
Justice, the counternarcotics aerial surveillance program in Peru was formally and most 
significantly interrupted in early 1994, when the U.S. DoD, which was still providing ground-
based radar tracking and ISR support to Peru for counternarcotics operations, stopped providing 
information that could be used by the FAP to interdict and shoot down aircraft. This decision 
came as a result of concerns that U.S. personnel could be held criminally liable under U.S. 
national law based on the Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1984, which specifically warns about the use 
of deadly force by foreign governmental agencies against civil aircraft “registered in a country 
other than the United States while such aircraft is in service or cause damage to such an aircraft 
which renders that aircraft incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger that aircraft’s safety 
in flight".76  Furthermore, U.S. officials involved in air interdiction operations had concerns over 
the increased risks brought by Decree Law Number 25426, which authorized shootdowns when 
necessary, and the Government of Colombia’s announcement in early 1994 that it would also 
implement a policy authorizing the use of deadly force against suspected narcotrafficking 
aircraft.  Consequently, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) Office of Legal Counsel issued a 
formal opinion that U.S. personnel who provided assistance or information used by the FAP to 
shoot down or destroy a civil aircraft could be held criminally liable under the aforementioned 
U.S. law.  As a result, on May 1, 1994, U.S. support to the Peruvian interdiction of drug flights 
75 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 3.  
76 18 United States Code Section 32(b)(2)2, Destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities. This implemented the 1971 
Montreal Sabotage Convention in accordance with international law. 
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2011-title18/USCODE-2011-title18-partI-chap2-sec32  
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was officially suspended, pending a thorough review of the legal questions surrounding the U.S. 
involvement in those operations.   
The details of the frustrations felt by both governments following the sudden U.S. 
suspension to the aerial tracking assistance in Peru is highlighted in a U.S. Embassy cable from 
Lima three days after the U.S. DoD’s announcement.  In the cable, the U.S. Ambassador in Peru 
sent a message to Pentagon officials requesting that the DoD postpone a planned visit to Peru 
pending the outcome of the tense issue.  The postponement of the visit, which had been intended 
to persuade Peru to preserve a counterdrug helicopter unit owned by the DoS illustrates the 
extent to which the impasse disrupted U.S. counternarcotics programs in the Andes in general 
and reveals the level of frustration felt by officials in the two countries: "Our inability to define a 
reliable USG (U.S. government) policy," the Ambassador states, "leaves us unable to 
authoritatively resolve the current uncertainty about this aspect of DoD counternarcotics 
cooperation."77 
On April 28, 1994, another U.S. Embassy cable from Lima shows a request from the 
Charges de’Faire to the Peruvian Ministry of Defense that they provide a guarantee that weapons 
would not be used against "civil aircraft in flight."78  In response, Fujimori’s Minister of Defense 
at the time, General Victor Malca Villanueva, delivered a letter suggesting the suspension of all 
U.S. intelligence flights over Peruvian airspace as well as operations at the U.S.-operated radar 
site at Yurimaguas, "while the North American government takes a definitive decision" with 
respect to the sharing of real-time tracking data.  The General Villanueva also quotes from the 
77 “Shootdown in Peru: The Secret U.S. Debate Over Intelligence Sharing with Peru and Colombia” National 
Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 44 (April 23, 2001), Edited by Michael L. Evans, 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB44/  
78 U.S. Embassy Lima, Your Proposed Visit to Peru, May 4, 1994. 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB44/doc4.pdf  
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Chicago Convention on civil aviation, noting "every state has full and exclusive sovereignty in 
the airspace situated over its territory."79 
The DoS frustration about what they considered an abrupt unilateral DoD decision to 
suspend the sharing of real-time intelligence is evident in another now-declassified confidential 
memorandum, prepared by the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters for a briefing with the 
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher.  According to the document, the suspension of 
surveillance support to Peru and Colombia "has undercut our counternarcotics efforts and 
damaged our credibility in the hemisphere" and the U.S. embassies "were caught completely off-
guard" by the decision, and, "several of our fundamental foreign policy and narcotics control 
interests are now at risk."80 The U.S. ambassadors in both Peru and Colombia were concerned 
that the decision would weaken other U.S. policy issues in the region and give the “greenlight” to 
narcotraffickers who were now likely to expand their operations.81 
The Clinton White House shared the view that the suspension of these ISR activities was 
the wrong decision, and along with collaboration from the DoD, CIA, and DoS, understood that 
the U.S. intelligence-sharing program with the Latin American countries had so far proved 
successful at reducing narcotrafficking, and they in turn should be resumed. Hence, the White 
House convened an interagency review to determine a legal remedy to the concerns that had 
been raised by the DoD.82 The interagency review led to the crafting of a legislative proposal to 
address concerns about the safety of aircraft.  First, in July 1994, the U.S. Senate adopted an 
79 U.S. Embassy Lima, Suspension of Provision of DoD Real-time Radar Track Data to Peru, May 9, 1994, 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB44/doc5.pdf 
80 DoS, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Talking Points: Implication of DoD's Forcedown Decision, May 
9, 1994, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB44/doc6.pdf 
81 See note above.  
82 U.S. SSCI, Review of United States Assistance 4. 
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amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for the upcoming Fiscal Year 1995, and 
provided relief from the 1984 Aircraft Sabotage Act, granted the President had determined that 
interdiction was appropriate considering “drug trafficking posed an extraordinary threat to the 
national security of a country” and that country had “appropriate procedures in place to protect 
against the innocent loss of life.”  One point of contention during the Congressional debate over 
the amendment was the position that these interdiction procedures should include “extensive 
efforts to make contact with a suspect aircraft, including visual signals and warning shots.”83  
Thus, even seven years before the fatal accident with the missionary plane, there was justified 
government consternation that civilian lives were at risk and shoud be protected by thorough 
measures to positively identify intercepted aircraft.   
By October, the new legislation was signed into law and granted immunity to anyone 
engaged in air interdiction if certain conditions were met: that the aircraft was reasonably 
suspected of being primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking and that the U.S. president 
deemed the operations necessary for national security, and that the host nation had procedures in 
place to protect against civilian casualties.  On December 1, 1994 Clinton issued Presidential 
Determination Number 95-7, Resumption of U.S. Drug Interdiction Assistance to the 
Government of Colombia (PD 95-7), and a week later on December 8, 1994, he issued 
Presidential Determination Number 95-9, Resumption of U.S. Drug Interdiction Assistance to 
the Government of Peru (PD 95-9), in which Clinton determined that Peru met U.S. legal 
requirements for renewed interdiction support. Specifically, PD 95-9 considered that: “The GOP 
has established rigorous procedures to ensure adequate protection against the loss of innocent 
life. The procedure for identifying and communicating with intercepted aircraft are based on 
83 See note above. 
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ICAO guidelines, and are contained in classified GOP plans and orders, as well as in Civil 
Aviation law 24882.”84  
2.2. Establishing Air Bridge Denial Standard Operating Procedures 
With PD 95-9, the stage was set for renewed U.S.-Peruvian air interdictions of suspected 
narcotraffickers.  Along with PD 95-9 came the accompanying Memorandum of Justification 
(MOJ), which authorized support for ABDP and set out, in detail, the required U.S. and Peruvian 
procedures for ABDP.  The MOJ is the first official evidence of formal procedures agreed upon 
between the U.S. and the Peruvian government regarding air interdiction operations.  The MOJ 
stated that only aircraft “reasonably suspected of being primarily engaged in narcotrafficking 
could be legitimate targets” under the interdiction program, and that “the use of weapons against 
narcotrafficking aircraft in flight by the Peruvian Air Force may be authorized under very strict 
conditions after all attempts to identify innocent aircraft and to persuade suspected aircraft to 
land at a controlled airfield have been exhausted.”85 The MOJ went on to describe Peru’s 
interdiction procedures in detail, including the mandate that Peruvian interceptor aircraft attempt 
to communicate with the suspected aircraft via radio.  If the radio communication attempts were 
to fail, the interceptor aircraft was to use a series of visual communications procedures: “if radio 
contact is not possible the Peruvian Air Force pilot must use a series of internationally 
recognized procedures to make visual contact with the suspect aircraft and to direct the aircraft to 
84 Presidential Determination No. 95-9, Resumption of U.S. Drug Interdiction Assistance to the Government of 
Peru, December 8, 1994, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB44/doc12.pdf 
85Memorandum of Justification for Presidential Determination Regarding the Resumption of U.S. Aerial Tracking 
Information Sharing and Other Assistance to the Government of Peru, included in CIA, Report of Investigation, 25 
August 2008, 296-298. 
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follow the intercepting aircraft to a secure airfield for inspection.”86 The internationally 
recognized procedures referred to in the MOJ are those established by the ICAO, and require that 
“while flying in front or above the target aircraft, the interceptor plane must wag its wings up and 
down, flash its navigational lights on and off at irregular intervals, and then fly off to the left 
signaling ‘follow me,’” as had occurred during the 1992 intercept of the U.S. C-130 by the FAP 
jets.87  Alternatively, the MOJ stated the FAP interceptor could fly above and in front of the 
suspected aircraft and lower its landing gear or turn on landing lights, which also indicated that 
the target aircraft should land.   
According to the MOJ, if the suspected target aircraft did not respond to the visual 
signals, the interceptor aircraft should then fire warning shots, and if these were ignored, 
disabling shots:  
If the aircraft continues to ignore the internationally recognized instructions to land, the 
Peruvian Air Force pilot—only after gaining the permission of the Commanding General 
of the VI RAT (Peruvian Air Force Sixth Territorial Air Defense Command) or in his 
absence the Chief of Staff—may fire warning shots in accordance with specified 
Peruvian Air Force procedures.  If these are ignored, and only after again obtaining the 
approval of the Command General of the VI RAT or in his absence the Chief of Staff, the 
Peruvian Air Force pilot may use weapons against the trafficking aircraft with the goal of 
disabling it.88   
The MOJ also outlines the authorizations for shootdowns by the Commander of the FAP VI 
RAT or his Chief of Staff: “The final decision to use force against civil aircraft in flight—once 
all other steps have been exhausted—requires authorization from the VI RAT Commander—or 
in his absence his Chief of Staff—who will verify that all appropriate procedures have been 
86 CIA, Report of Investigation, 16 and 297. 
87 See note above.  
88 CIA, Report of Investigation, 297.  
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fulfilled.”89  As will be seen during the execution of ABDP, these procedures were rarely 
followed by the FAP during shootdown procedures.  
The ABDP was established east of the Andes in a region designated as a special air 
defense identification zone (ADIZ). Within this ADIZ, any aircraft flying during daylight hours 
below the altitudes flown by commercial airlines could be interdicted by the FAP.  At night, all 
aircraft were prohibited from flying with the zone, with the exception of commercial aircraft, or 
aircraft with prior FAP authorization.90 Regarding the obligations of the U.S. personnel involved 
in the program, the MOJ states:  
As part of their standard operation instructions, all official U.S. government personnel in 
jointly manned facilities and platforms will regularly monitor compliance with agreed 
procedures and immediately report any irregularities through their chain of command. 
Should there be evidence suggesting that procedures are not being followed, the U.S. 
government will reevaluate whether Peru has appropriate procedures to protect against 
the loss of innocent life.91   
This section clearly required appropriate oversight that the standard operating procedures were 
being followed.  However, as will also be seen during an investigation of the actual shootdowns 
between 1995-2001, this section of the MOJ would be blatantly disregarded at multiple levels 
throughout the years of ABDP.  
2.3. Air Bridge Denial Aircraft, Crew, and Formal Chain of Command 
The ABDP in Peru relied primarily on three aircraft: one U.S. asset, the Cessna C-560 
Citation, and two variations of FAP interceptors, the Cessna A-37B Dragonfly and the Embraer 
EMB-312 Tucano.  The Citation, operated by the CIA, is a twin engine corporate jet equipped 
89 See note above.  
90 CIA, Report of Investigation, 17. 
91 CIA, Report of Investigation, 17. 
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with ISR sensors, most notably its air-to-air tracking radar.92 Additionally, the Citation has a 
broad airspeed operating range, meaning it can cover and track both fast and slow moving 
aircraft.  The FAP’s A-37s are converted U.S. Air Force jet trainers, and are equipped with a 
7.62mm Gatling gun in the nose of the aircraft.  Moreover, the A-37s are fast aircraft, with a 
minimum speed of approximately 130 knots, which proved problematic during intercepts of 
slower moving aircraft, as would be the case in the missionary plane shootdown.  The other 
aircraft used for Peruvian ABDP interdictions was the FAP EMB-312 Tucano, a single-engine 
turboprop fighter, armed with a 12.7mm machine gun on each wing.  The Tucano is slower than 
the A-37, and has a longer dwell time on target, meaning it was better suited for intercepting 
slow moving single-engine civilian aircraft (it would likely have been better suited to 
intercepting the missionary plane), but the Tucano would not be as effective flying against a 
faster twin-engine aircraft that many narcotraffickers employed.93 Of note, neither one of the 
FAP interceptor aircraft had air-to-air radars or infrared imaging capabilities to track intercepted 
aircraft, thus they relied on information passed from the Citation, and FAP aircraft intercepts 
relied on visual identification.  
92 U.S. SSCI, Review of United States Assistance, 10. 
93 U.S. SSCI, Review of United States Assistance, 10. 
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Figure 3. Example photo of a Cessna Citation aircraft. Note: this is not the actual CIA ISR 
aircraft model used for ABDP in the 1990s, rather this is the updated modern ISR version—the 
surveillance sensors are visible under the front of the fuselage. However, this provides a good 
idea of what the CIA-operated aircraft may have looked like (CIA photos unavailable).94 
94 Arie Egozi,“Mexico receives special mission Citations,” Flight Global, January 3, 2017, 
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/mexico-receives-special-mission-citations-432840/ 
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Figure 4. Example of a FAP A-37B Dragonfly.95 
95 Manuel J. Armas, Airliners.net, December 13, 2014, https://www.airliners.net/photo/Peru-Air-Force/Cessna-A-
37B-Dragonfly-318E/2606385  
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Figure 5. Example of a FAP EMB-312 Tucano.96 
The CIA Citation tracker aircraft were based in Pucallpa, Peru, and the CIA Officer in 
Charge (OIC) was responsible for supervision of local U.S. air operations and personnel.  During 
each mission, the OIC would maintain radio communications with the tracker aircraft and 
monitored the air interdiction operations, reporting the conduct of procedures to CIA personnel 
at headquarters.97  The Citations were equipped with a videotaping capability to record each air 
interdiction.  Following each mission, the videos were to be reviewed by CIA personnel to 
ensure adherence to standard operation procedures. If any irregularities were noted during video 
review, the CIA officers in charge at Pucallpa were to then pass written statements up to 
headquarters, along with the videos.98  There was also a CIA Officer stationed with the VI RAT 
96 Fernando Rospigliosi, “Ataque al amanecer,” Caretas, no. 1352, February, 1995, 
http://www.galeon.com/aviacionperucenepa/tucanos.html. 
97 CIA, Report of Investigation 19. 
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FAP Commander in Juanjui (and later in Iquitos) who monitored transmission between the 
Citation and the ground commanders throughout the intercept procedures.  These CIA officers 
were also meant to report on any deviations from standard operating procedures during the 
missions. 
The Citation crew was composed of a pilot, co-pilot, mission sensor operator who 
operation the infrared radar and video recorder, and a FAP Host Nation Rider (HNR), typically a 
FAP major or lieutenant colonel ground control radar officer.99 Most of the CIA pilots, co-pilots, 
and sensor operators for ABDP were former U.S. military personnel.100  The HNR was 
essentially the most critical position, considering he was responsible for relaying commands 
between Peruvian authorities on the ground, and the FAP interceptor aircraft, and for 
coordinating positions of both the Citation and the FAP aircraft.  Of note, because the HNR was 
expected to serve as the primary go-between for the U.S. Citation crew, the FAP officials on the 
ground, and the FAP interceptors, he was required to be bilingual —that is to say, able to 
effectively communicate in both Spanish and English during missions. In fact, the HNR was 
essentially tasked with translating the English message of the Citation crew regarding the intent 
of suspected aircraft, while directing the interceptor aircraft on to the target in Spanish. The 
question of how the FAP guaranteed this level of language aptitude remains unclear; however, in 
post-ABDP interviews U.S. crewmembers rated HNR English language skills from “poor” to 
“good.”101  If a HNR did not possess adequate language skills, U.S. officials could request that 
the FAP remove him from the program.  Also, according to the CIA, in the beginning of the 
98 CIA, Report of Investigation 19. 
99 U.S. SSCI, Review of United States Assistance, 9. 
100 See note above.   
101 See note above.  
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program, U.S. officials would interview and assess HNR for English language proficiency 
themselves.  However, this screening process apparently stopped early on during ABDP.102 
The CIA pilots were also given minimal Spanish lessons, though their training consisted 
of two week long basic Spanish “crash courses,” which were obviously not sufficient for fluency, 
or even conversational level communications; however the U.S. crew operated under the 
assumption the FAP officer was bilingual.103 This lack of multiple bilingual crew member 
positions meant that the FAP HNR became the critical focal point for communication between 
the U.S. and Peruvian officials and aircraft, meaning effective and timely communication flow 
under mission pressures of multi-tasking during condensed timelines relied on a potential single 
key point—a detail clearly shown to be problematic over time considering translation 
misunderstandings and task saturation.  The other potential problem with consistency in the 
program was the high rate of personnel turnover on both sides.  For example, the U.S. personnel 
deployed for 30-day tours in Peru and the average deployment time for the FAP HNR was just 
two weeks.104  That meant that program personnel were constantly rotating, thus reducing 
continuity in procedures and expertise. 
The other personnel complexity and potential point of frustration recognized by ABDP 
was the parallel chain of command structure established by each country.  The U.S. CIA OIC 
was stationed in Pucallpa and controlled the U.S. side of the mission and sent orders directly to 
the Citation crew.  The Peruvian chain of command centered on the HNR on board the Citation 
who then coordinated with the VI RAT Headquarters and FAP interceptor pilots once airborne.  
102 U.S. SSCI, Review of United States Assistance, 9. 
103 See note above.   
104 See note above.  
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Under the established chain of command and authorities laid out by the PD and MOJ, only the 
Peruvian officials were authorized to order and execute a shootdown.105  In other words, the U.S. 
crewmembers were only meant to provide information and advise the operations.  To coordinate 
operations, the HNR would use the same radio frequency as the U.S. pilots to coordinate with VI 
RAT.  This also proved frustrating, as post-ABDP interviews and analysis illustrated that the 
same radio frequency was consistently used by multiple operators, meaning there could be 
various users talking at the same time on the same frequency and causing confusion.106  
The first step of the air interdiction was to identify the suspected target plane and 
determine whether or not it was a legitimate and legal flight.  However, this initial step was 
difficult, considering that many civil aircraft did not always file accurate or timely flight plans 
over the remote jungle region that was part of the ADIZ (as would be realized in the case later of 
Kevin Donaldson).  There were also difficulties coordinating with local airports and control 
towers in the remote regions to verify whether flight plans had indeed been filed.  Moreover, 
there was the fear that communication could spook suspected aircraft to attempt evasion, or even 
cross international borders into Brazil or Colombia, before the interdiction was possible.  Thus, 
both CIA and FAP personnel were hesitant to even attempt radio communication with suspected 
aircraft until after interceptor aircraft had arrived on scene.  Regarding visual identification, the 
Citation would first attempt to detect and observe the registration tail number of the aircraft.  
Once the tail number was obtained, the HNR was directed to call the Commanding General of 
the VI RAT in Juanjui to compare the number to a list of legally registered aircraft in Peru.  The 
HNR was also supposed to carry a copy of this list for reference.  If the tail number belonged to a 
legally registered civil aircraft, the intercept would be called off.  If not, or if the tail number 
105 U.S. SSCI, Review of United States Assistance, 10. 
106 See note above.   
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could not be obtained, the intercept procedures continued.107  If the Citation could not observe 
the tail number of the suspected aircraft, the pilots were instructed to provide a visual description 
of the aircraft, including the make, model, and color, to the VI RAT Commander.  Based on the 
description and directional heading of the aircraft, the VI RAT ground officials were to also 
check the list of flight plans to see if any matched the suspected aircraft.  Of note, following the 
investigation into ABDP and interviews with CIA officers, it was stated that even with 
identifying information from the Citation, it was typically difficult to find corroborating flight 
plan information.  Moreover, if a flight occurred at night, this identification step was considered 
unnecessary since all night flights in the special ADIZ were already considered illegal under 
Peruvian law.108 According to the aforementioned MOJ, if identification attempts failed to 
establish that suspected aircraft were legitimate, the VI RAT Commander could authorize the 
launch of FAP interceptors.  Once airborne, the HNR on the Citation would pass the coordinates 
of the target aircraft to the FAP interceptor jet to attempt to visually locate the target aircraft 
(including at night through the use of night vision goggles).  The Citation would then record each 
event on video and audio tied to the aircraft sensors and communications, as mentioned.109  
 Once either the FAP Tucano or A-37 arrived on station, each intercept included three 
phases.  During Phase I, the interceptor aircraft would attempt to communicate with the target 
after visually acquiring it and detecting and confirming its tail number.  According to the MOJ 
and bilateral agreements, the interceptor aircraft was required to attempt to reach the suspected 
aircraft on at least two different radio frequencies.  As mentioned in the MOJ, if radio contact 
107 CIA, Report of Investigation, 19. 
108 CIA, Report of Investigation, 20. 
109 CIA, Report of Investigation, 21. 
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was not possible, the FAP pilot “must use a series of internationally recognized procedures to 
make visual contact” with the suspected aircraft, including the aforementioned wing wagging, 
lowering of landing gear, flashing lights, or even giving visual hand signals.110  Despite the MOJ 
requirements, post-ABDP interviews and investigations revealed that CIA officers believed these 
visual signal procedures to be optional if they might affect the safety of the interceptor aircraft or 
potentially cause alarm to the suspected aircraft causing it to evade and escape interdiction. The 
FAP pilots interviewed after the program confirmed that these visual signals were difficult to 
exercise for various concerns over safety and mission, and acknowledged that they were never 
actually performed (video tape review of the intercepts confirms this).111 
Subsequently, the VI RAT Commander could then authorize Phase II, the firing of 
warning shots, if the target aircraft did not respond to previous attempts to make contact with the 
target. The warning shots were tracer rounds fired by the interceptor aircraft intended to get the 
attention of the target aircraft.  Of note, post-ABDP investigations also illustrated that these 
tracer rounds were difficult to see during the day light hours, during which most of the 
shootdowns under ABDP occurred.112  The other problematic aspect of tracer rounds is that 
much of the old tracer ammunition used by the FAP Tucanos and A-37s would only ignite 
briefly, and was likely not visible by the time it reached the target aircraft pilot’s field of view.  
Moreover, the interceptor aircraft position likely made it more difficult for suspected target 
aircraft to see the warning shots.  According to the established procedures, the FAP aircraft were 
to fly in front and to the left of the target aircraft to maximize effectiveness of visual signals.  
110 CIA, Report of Investigation, 297. 
111 This is according to the interviews with the FAP pilots and operators outlined in CIA, Report of Investigation, 22. 
112 CIA, Report of Investigation, 22. 
45	
However, almost all of the post-ABDP videos analysis shows the FAP interceptors stayed behind 
the target aircraft during the warning shots of Phase II, obviously making them more difficult to 
be seen to the crew of the target aircraft.  This is due to the aforementioned cautionary approach 
outlined in Phase I, in which FAP pilots stated they were worried that flying in front of suspected 
narcotrafficking aircraft would be dangerous to the interceptors.113   
Should the target aircraft not respond to the warning shots of Phase II, the VI RAT 
Commander could then authorize Phase III, which was the use of weapons to disable the target 
aircraft, still with the intent of forcing the suspected aircraft to heed warnings and obey the 
signals to land.  Only after all attempts to force the aircraft to land would the VI RAT 
Commander be authorized to shootdown the target.  
The PD and MOJ issued by the U.S. government did not outline a specific timeframe for 
all three phases to be followed and to give the target aircraft appropriate time to respond to 
warnings.  However, there did seem to be a pattern of compressing timelines and rushing through 
the phases, likely due to worries that intercepted aircraft would attempt to evade and escape the 
interdiction. Based on reviews of shootdowns after the program, in at least nine of the first 14 
shootdowns, fewer than 10 minutes elapsed between all phases, and in six of the ABDP 
shootdowns, fewer than two minutes – a timeline that at least to many CIA officials interviewed 
after-the-fact seemed too fast for effectively proceeding through each phase of the intercept.  On 
the U.S. side, the MOJ outlined the reporting requirements for CIA officials involved in ABDP, 
stipulating that if there were evidence that interdiction procedures were not followed, the U.S. 
would “reevaluate whether Peru has appropriate procedures to protect against the innocent loss 
113 CIA, Report of Investigation, 22. 
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of life.”114 During post-ABDP interviews, U.S. officials confirmed they understood the 
requirement to monitor compliance of the MOJ procedures. 
Following the PD and MOJ, U.S. and FAP personnel met and drafted a document 
together to synchronize the technical step-by-step instructions for conducting intercepts.  Each 
year, following the annual FAP VI RAT Change of Command, the two countries would revisit 
and update procedures.  However, the only written binational step-by-step procedures that could 
be found during the investigation of the ABDP were those from 1997 and two documents from 
1999.  None of these instructions for ABDP crewmembers contained the cautionary requirement 
set out by the PD and MOJ to perform visual signals.  According to one of the U.S. pilots 
interviewed, this requirement to perform visual signals was dropped from the standard operating 
procedures in 1996 because the FAP pilots considered them too dangerous.115  This move was 
contrary to the original U.S. government requirements that permitted the U.S. government to 
renew an air interdiction program with Peru.  While it is apparent that the FAP was never 
comfortable with the visual signal requirement outlined by the MOJ, it was still mandatory that 
officials report this deviation in the original standard operating procedures to CIA Headquarters.  
Moreover, CIA officials recognized this was a persistent problem, but neglected to exercise 
appropriate accountability.  In 1997, the CIA OIC did not sign the FAP’s standard operating 
procedures (even though ABDP operations continued).  However, the CIA OIC did sign on to a 
new version of FAP standard operating procedures created in 1999, which blatantly disregarded 
the PD and MOJ requirements.116      
114 CIA, Report of Investigation, 23. 
115 CIA, Report of Investigation, 24. 
116 See note above.  
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The first CIA OIC for renewed operations under ABDP in Peru in 1995 explained away 
the mismatch of U.S.-FAP procedures and the requirements of the PD and MOJ stating that the 
FAP and ICAO set out different requirements and that “all intercept procedures, to include visual 
signals such as wing waggling and warning shots, were mandatory for both day and night 
intercepts, but effective use of procedures depended on many things.”117  Besides the issue 
concerning the aforementioned tracer rounds not burning long enough to provide effective visual 
signals to the target aircraft, the suspected aircraft typically flew low, at tree top level, and the 
FAP interceptors were unable to safely maneuver in front for the wing waggling.  The CIA OIC 
asserted that it was understood that if visual signals could not be successfully accomplished, the 
FAP interceptor would be required to break contact.  However, later testimonies from U.S. and 
FAP aircrews showed they were unaware of this actual requirement to break off intercepts and 
not proceed with shootdowns if visual signals could not be conducted.118   
During interviews following the 2001 incident, the FAP VI RAT Commander during the 
period of operations from 1995-1996 explained that FAP interceptors would attempt to make 
visual contact with target aircraft by flying beside the suspected aircraft and performing 
maneuvers, such as wing waggling to get the attention of the suspected aircraft.  He also 
mentioned that these maneuvers would not be done at night because it was too dangerous, and 
instead warning shots would serve as the primary visual warning signals.  Furthermore, he 
claimed that 90 percent of shootdowns occurred at night. However, a video review of the 
program paints a very different story—11 of the 15 shootdowns occurred during daylight 
117 CIA, Report of Investigation, 25. 
118 See note above.  
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hours.119 In other words, these statements were false.  These patterns of disregard for effective 
visual signals and warnings, and the rushing of the intercept phases without extra precautions 
inevitably led to the loss of life in 2001.    
CHAPTER 3. Air Bridge Denial Program in Action 
3.1. Overview of first 14 Shootdowns  
The following section provides a brief overview of the first 14 shootdowns of the ABDP 
in Peru beginning in 1995 until the Bowers shootdown in 2001.  In every single case, there are 
noted discrepancies and errors, including the failure by the FAP interceptors to perform visual 
signals, violations in reporting of the program by the U.S. officials, failure of the Peruvian chain 
of command to authorize the shootdowns, insufficient time to assess the situation and perform all 
required steps in the protocol, failure to fire warning shots, and interference by the U.S. crew (to 
assert themselves in the chain of command).120   Moreover, according to declassified 
investigations, despite consistent violations of standard operating procedures for the duration 
ABDP in Peru, only one deviation during a 1997 shootdown was actually officially reported as 
problematic during the lifecycle of the program.121   
Following the formal approval for the resumption of the ABDP in Peru at the end of 
1994, the first shootdown occurred on May 16, 1995.  The first shootdown occurred during 
daylight hours in the ADIZ against a suspected Cessna narcotrafficking aircraft that according to 
the FAP carried a “false tailnumber (registration)” actually belonging to a DC-8 aircraft in 
119 CIA, Report of Investigation, 26 
120 CIA, Report of Investigation, 30. 
121 See note above.   
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Peru.122  The aircraft apparently took evasive maneuvers and was unresponsive to the interceptor.  
Moreover, according to the CIA report filed on that same day, the FAP A-37 “fully complied 
with Peruvian laws and international forcedown procedures” stating that the A-37 had been 
under VI RAT control and made “by-the-book” intercept including following all required steps 
“ad nauseum.”123   
However, the reality is that even this first shootdown was problematic.  A review of the 
videotape years later during the CIA Inspector General investigation, showed that there was no 
indication of visual signals (as required), no authorization from the FAP ground commanders for 
the shootdown to take place (a break in the chain of command requirements), and blatant U.S. 
crew interference in the procedures, with the Citation pilot stating “shoot him down” after 
warning shots had been fired by the intercepting A-37.  The HNR in this case relayed the 
message from the Citation pilot directly to the A-37, without consulting the VI RAT 
Commander.124 The post-shootdown cables from the CIA OIC in Pucallpa up the chain to the 
U.S. Congress ended with a message that “FAP made effort to convince target to land. Target 
evaded. FAP made by book effort (radio, signals, warning shots, etc.) to force compliance.”125  
The Congressional Notification also stressed that the intercept was in accordance with PD 95-9. 
Thus, misinformed by the officials of ABDP, the U.S. Congress was satisfied that strict MOJ 
procedures had been followed.  Of note, in the post-ABDP investigation, the CIA Inspector 
General outlines the CIA officials who were responsible for the inaccurate reporting at the time, 
but their names have been redacted from the report and that information is not publicly available 
122 CIA, Report of Investigation, 35. 
123 CIA, Report of Investigation, 32. 
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to the knowledge of this author.  Thus, even from the first shootdown, the stage was set for a 
breaking established procedures, and for lying to headquarters and authorities like the U.S. 
Congress in an effort to promote the successes of the program, in spite of known violations and 
risky behavior.   
The second shootdown occurred the following month on June 23, 1995.  This interdiction 
occurred shortly after sunset, thus only the audio portion of the video is available.  In this 
instance, the official report stated that an aircraft was intercepted at 6:10 p.m. local time with the 
Citation guiding the FAP Tucano interceptor onto target.  The report stated that VI RAT (with 
HNR relay) had granted permission to perform three passes on the target with radio calls and 
then two series of warning shots.  At 6:37 p.m. permission was granted by the VI RAT to engage 
and destroy the target (Phase III).  At 6:42 p.m. the aircraft was shot down and it crashed.  
Finally, the report stated that the “suspect was destroyed when it failed to heed all recognized 
international interception signals” and the CIA official commented that the team “once again” 
followed established procedures.”126  Moreover, the messages up the chain of command from the 
CIA OIC in Pucallpa stated that performance of all FAP VI RAT parties had been “excellent” 
with procedures being followed.127 U.S. Congress received notification from CIA Headquarters 
that the CIA officials were “satisfied Peruvian Air Force followed established procedures before 
firing on the aircraft.”128 
However, again there were noted violations of protocol once the facts are actually 
considered.  Post-incident review shows that once again visual signals were not performed.  The 
126 CIA, Report of Investigation, 42. 
127 CIA, Report of Investigation, 41. 
128 See note above.  
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FAP pilot from this shootdown was interviewed after 2001 and also stated that visual signals 
would have been too dangerous (which became de facto practice, as previously mentioned).129   
Additionally, there was not a reasonable period of time for the suspect aircraft to respond to 
warnings.  Fewer than two minutes elapsed between the radio and authorization for Phase III, 
and only five minutes between the radio call and the actual shootdown.  Additionally, the Tucano 
fired warning shots before being authorized to do so, and the HNR gave the orders to the pilot of 
the Tucano to shoot down the intercepted aircraft before receiving authorization from the 
ground.130   
Another month passed before the third shootdown on July 14, 1995.  In this instance, the 
suspected narcotrafficker was detected by the Citation and intercepted just before sunset at 5:50 
p.m. local time by an A-37.  The report states at 5:53 p.m., the VI RAT confirmed that the
aircraft’s “tailnumber (registration) did not exist.”  At 5:55 p.m. local the A-37 fired warning 
shots, and the target attempted to evade.  The official CIA report states “after all international 
intercept procedures (radio calls and warning shots), under orders from VI RAT Commander, 
aircraft fired on by A-37 at 6:00 p.m. while trying to evade” and then at 6:03 p.m. the aircraft 
“makes emergency landing/sinks” in the river.131  Once again, after the shootdown the CIA 
officials communicated to the U.S. Embassy, CIA Headquarters, and up to the U.S. Congress 
that “FAP followed all established procedures.”132   
However, a review of the video of the third shootdown shows a much different story, 
again riddled with violations.  First, even though the official report stated that the FAP had 
129 CIA, Report of Investigation, 41. 
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checked the registration number of the aircraft and confirmed it as false prior to shootdown, this 
proved untrue.  The target aircraft’s registration number was not actually confirmed by the FAP 
as not being registered until after the order to shoot it down.  Moreover, the aircraft had been 
intercepted randomly, with no previous intelligence to cue the intercept.  Once again, no visual 
signals were performed.  Additionally, the target aircraft may have actually tried to communicate 
with the FAP A-37, since it had turned its lights on and off at regular intervals—one of the 
international signals for a response.  The process was rapid, with little chance for possible 
reaction from the target (22 seconds elapsed between Phase II warning shots and the order to 
move to Phase III shootdown—even though the original cable falsely stated it had been four 
minutes).133 Once again, the HNR ordered the A-37 to perform the shootdown before approval 
from the VI RAT Commander on the ground.  Also, the U.S. Citation crew interjected 
themselves again in the chain of command, instructing the HNR twice to shoot down the target. 
After the target crash-landed in the river, and the downed crew was observed swimming away, 
the Citation pilots instructed the HNR twice that the FAP fighter should strafe the crashed 
aircraft—a message to the HNR that was relayed to the A-37 in Spanish (“continue to shoot” and 
then two minutes later at 6:02 p.m. “yes, shoot again” with a response from the HNR of 
“okay”).134  It is unclear if the strafing of the downed aircraft actually occurred, but on the tape 
the HNR says to the A-37 in Spanish “I understand you hit him again.”135  Finally, besides 
misinforming U.S. authorities again that procedures had been followed, the ABDP CIA officials 
133 CIA, Report of Investigation, 49. 
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lied twice to the U.S. Military Group at the U.S. Embassy in Lima, stating that the HNR had 
received authorization from the VI RAT Commander, per protocol.   
A week later, on July 21, 1995, the fourth shootdown occurred, again around the same 
hours of operation at dusk, with the target of interest being identified by the Citation as 
tailnumber registration OB712 at 5:57 p.m. The official original CIA report stated that a Peru 
FAP attempted to establish radio contact with OB712 at 6:39 p.m., and at 6:46 p.m., under VI 
RAT orders warning shots were fired.  The target attempted to “evade wildly.” Then at 6:50 
p.m., again under VI RAT orders the A-37 engaged the target, which then exploded and crashed.
Once again it was reported that the intercept “fully followed established Peruvian and 
international warning procedures and protocols.”136   The Congressional Notification stated that 
the CIA and ABDP officials were “satisfied that the FAP followed all established procedures 
before firing on the aircraft.” 
Of course, later review of the video showed similar errors and deviations again with this 
shootdown.  The U.S. pilots are heard in the tape giving phase engagement instructions to the 
HNR.  Additionally, again the VI RAT Commander is skipped as the HNR instructed the A-37 to 
proceed with warning shots.  Additionally, the HNR is heard asking the Citation pilots if 
authorization was already given (which the Citation was not allowed to give).  Finally, the HNR 
instructs the A-37 to “proceed to shoot him down” (at the same time that the official report said 
that warning shots were ordered).137  Of note, there are gaps in the video, which make it difficult 
to assess exactly what other protocols were ignored, although one can assume that visual signals 
were likely ignored considering the position of the A-37 reported half a mile behind the target of 
interest.  The lack of visual signaling/warning, combined with the HNR not coordinating 
136 CIA, Report of Investigation, 53. 
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approval with the VI RAT Command, the U.S. crewmembers inserting themselves into the 
killchain process, and the falsehoods and misrepresentations in the official cables following the 
shootdown were quickly becoming standard negative practices.    
The next month, on August 17, 1995, the fifth shootdown took place.  The target of 
interest had been acquired in the Nohaya area during the early morning hours based on an 
intelligence tip from the DEA.  The Citation reacquired the target at 6:15 a.m. local time.  A 
video review of that shootdown shows that at 6:23 a.m., the A-37 had acquired the target and the 
HNR told the A-37 “go ahead, you know the instructions.”  At 6:24 a.m., the U.S. Citation pilot 
told the HNR in English “tell him to shoot” after which the HNR relays the A-37 in Spanish 
“straight ahead, down.”  The A-37 acknowledged by repeating the instructions and added the 
follow-up question in Spanish “no questions asked?”  The Citation co-pilot said “firma, firma” 
indicating the affirmative.  The HNR then told the A-37 to proceed with the shootdown after 
giving the target of interest one opportunity before the shootdown.  The HNR also asked if the 
A-37 could see any identification number on the target, to which the A-37 pilot said he was not
close enough to see the tailnumber.  At 6:26 a.m., the Citation pilot instructed the HNR to tell the 
A-37 to land at Pucallpa, and if the target did not land to “shoot,” another example of the U.S.
crew portending to exercise authorities they did not have legally.  The HNR then told the A-37 in 
Spanish “tell him to return back to Pucallpa, if not, you’ll kill him.”138 At the same time, the A-
37 gave one radio warning to the target aircraft.  About thirty seconds later, the A-37 tells the 
HNR in Spanish that the target “is ignoring me; do I proceed to shoot him down?”  Six seconds 
later, the HNR says in Spanish “go ahead with the procedures then.”  At 6:27 a.m., the Citation 
noted that the A-37 was firing warning shots. After 22 seconds, the A-37 fired on the target of 
138 CIA, Report of Investigation, 57. 
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interest, without the HNR receiving authorization from the VI RAT Commander.  Moreover, 
only a total of 85 elapsed between the radio warning and the A-37 shootdown of the target, in 
what appeared to be a rushed process with little opportunity given to the target to respond.  And 
once again, as had become the new normal, the official CIA report stated, “discussions with FAP 
Command and OIC indicate FAP scrupulously adhered to international and Peruvian 
protocols.”139 However, the facts of the post-incident investigation revealed many of the same, 
persistent errors and violations in the procedures.   
The sixth shootdown under ABDP occurred on November 13, 1995, and followed similar 
violations in procedures.  Once again, the shootdown took place in the early morning hours, this 
time while it was still dark.  Thus, the Citation video only reveals the audio recording of the 
incident.  Initial CIA reporting stated that at 5:25 a.m., a FAP A-37 made contact with the target, 
a Piper Seneca aircraft.  At 5:36 a.m. it was reported that the A-37 gave verbal warnings and 
fired warning shots after the target aircraft ignored “repeated visual and radio signals.”140   The 
CIA then stated that VI RAT Commander authorized the A-37 to fire upon the Piper Seneca 
aircraft, using force “only as a last resort.”141 At 5:45 a.m., the target was hit by the A-37 and 
crashed in the Tigre River.  However, the reporting continued to ignore the fact that violations 
were rampant.  Again, the intercepting aircraft failed to provide visual warnings (resorting to the 
rationale regarding safety during periods of darkness) and there was again a lack of reasonable 
time for the suspected target aircraft to respond – the A-37 gave verbal warnings at the same 
time as firing warning shots.  Additionally, the authorization to engage had apparently been 
given by the VI RAT Commander 30 minutes before the warnings were even given, as a sort of 
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blanket authorization to proceed with the intercept.  The subsequent CIA cables contained 
conflicting information and timelines, and should have alerted Headquarters regarding the 
violations.   
Two weeks later, on November 27, 1995, the seventh shootdown was conducted during 
daylight hours, on a mission that began as a training exercise for the Citation and two FAP A-37 
aircraft.  During the training mission, a civilian plane was detected by ground-based radar at 
Pucallpa and relayed to the airborne assets.  At 10:40 a.m., the VI RAT gave authorization to 
warn the intercepted civilian aircraft to divert to Pucallpa.  According to the official CIA cable, 
the warning caused the target to take evasive action, and at 10:58 a.m., the target was hit by A-37 
gunfire and crashed.  The report, shorter and less sure in its confirmation that procedures were 
followed than as stated in previous ones, claims the target aircraft was “given the usual 
warnings—radio calls and warning shots—before being shot down by the FAP.”142 However, the 
video highlights that there was no reasonable identification of the aircraft or intelligence to 
support it as a narcotrafficker.  Additionally, after the shootdown it was not even confirmed if the 
aircraft had been carrying narcotics.  It could have potentially just been flying in the wrong 
region at the wrong time.  Of course there were no visual signals given, as had become standard 
practice.  Also, while the post-event report and cable states that warning shots were fired, there is 
no actual proof on the video that this occurred.  Nor is there audio reference to warning shots, 
nor evidence that tracer rounds were actually fired.  And finally, there is no indication that the 
HNR ever received or gave the order to shoot down the target aircraft. Instead, the video and 
audio suggest that the backup A-37 (in other words, the interceptor’s wingman) gave the order to 
fire.  Of note, the HNR for this mission told CIA investigators after 2001 that there was a blanket 
authorization for the shootdown, even before the mission began.  Therefore, authorization was 
142	CIA, Report of Investigation, 65.	
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already granted with no further permission necessary.143  Regardless, it appeared that the U.S. 
and FAP authorities had different understanding and definitions of what the ABDP procedures 
entailed, including the requirement for visual signals or for shootdown authorization from the VI 
RAT Commander during the mission itself.   
Approximately eight months passed before the eighth shootdown, on July 8, 1996.  An 
aircraft was detected during daylight hours flying without a tail number.  Again, the target 
aircraft was reported taking evasive maneuvers, flying low at tree top level, and heading for the 
Brazilian border.  The official cable on the day of the intercept stated “in compliance with 
Peruvian and international law, VI RAT Commander directed A-37 to take necessary action to 
force violator to comply with orders. A-37 fired on violator aircraft, apparently hitting the right 
engine.”144  Upon review, again there were no visual signals, no indication of warning shots 
actually given, and a lack of adequate time for the suspect target aircraft to respond (two minutes 
elapsed between the radio warning and the time of attack on the target).  The video also does not 
support the report’s claims that the VI RAT Commander directed the A-37 to take action.145   
The next shootdown, the ninth, was on March 23, 1997.  At the 5:56 p.m., the Citation 
relayed the suspect target’s position to an A-37.  Three minutes later, the A-37 attempted to 
communicate with the aircraft, asking it to land, but to no avail.  At 5:59 p.m., warning shots 
were fired and at 6:02 p.m., the official report stated that the VI RAT provided Phase III 
authorization for shootdown.  At 6:05 p.m., the A-37 engaged and shot down what was reported 
to be a narcotrafficking aircraft after “following proper procedures.” U.S. Congressional 
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Notification messaging echoed this report, following the standard line of “in accordance with 
proper procedure.”146 Of course, the video again paints a different narrative.  The A-37 did not 
provide visual signals, there is no indication of warning shots (only a radio warning), the HNR 
requested Phases II and III before the target had been positively identified, and the A-37 pilot 
asked the HNR for authorization to shoot down the target.  The HNR provided the requested 
authorization, again without a formal shootdown order from the VI RAT.   
Later that year, on August 4, 1997, the tenth shootdown also presented multiple 
violations of intercept procedures.  At 5:54 p.m., the VI RAT asked the Citation if it had 
identified the tailnumber of the target of interest, with the U.S. co-pilot stating “negative, we’re 
not gonna try to close to get the tail number because we don’t want to alert him.”  At 5:58 p.m., 
the VI RAT Commander gave the HNR instructions in Spanish to move to “Phase I and Phase 
II” and to try to get the target to land.   The A-37 arrived on target at 6:37 p.m., with limited 
visibility during dusk, and having noted that he is low on fuel and will have to return to base 
soon. The HNR then instructed the A-37 to move to Phase I and Phase II.  At 6:38 p.m. the A-37 
gave a radio warning to the target of interest.  The A-37 pilot reported no response to the radio 
warning, and HNR confirmed that Phase II is complete (even though warning shots were not 
observed on video, nor by the Citation crew).  The VI RAT Commander authorized Phase III at 
6:39 p.m., which is relayed by the HNR to the A-37.  During this time, the Citation crew also 
remarked they are “six minutes from Brazil,” indicating that the target was flying toward the 
border.  At 6:40 p.m. the A-37 fired on the target, damaging it and forcing it to crash in the 
jungle at 6:41 p.m. Once again the formal report stated, “all international warning procedures 
146 CIA, Report of Investigation, 73. 
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were complied with prior to the VI RAT Commander giving the order to shoot down the narco- 
aircraft.”147   
After the reporting of this incident, CIA Headquarters questioned the fact that only a few 
minutes elapsed between radio warning and shootdown, and asked CIA officials in Peru for 
clarification regarding the adherence to required procedures and the details of the shootdown.  
On August 5, Headquarters sent a cable to Peru and asked about “possible gaps in established 
procedures.”  Moreover, Headquarters was concerned that the radio frequency used to provide 
the warning call was not one of the recognized international distress signal frequencies.  The 
Headquarters cable suggested it was likely the target aircraft never heard the warning, and 
wanted subsequent reporting to be “full and complete.”148  The CIA ABDP officials in Peru 
responded rapidly to Headquarters stating: “All of us who work the Airbridge Denial Program 
(U.S. and Peruvian) understand and rigorously enforce compliance with all international 
procedures that must be followed prior to any use of force. That is a given in the work that is 
done here.”149  Agency Headquarters promptly thanked the officials in Peru for their hard work 
and mentioned that ABDP had become a highlight of the U.S. counternarcotics program.150  
 Shortly thereafter, on August 17, 1997, ABDP in Peru reported its eleventh shootdown, 
which sounded a sort of an alarm within the U.S. chain of command and spurred a review of the 
program’s procedures in Peru.  For the first time, the CIA officials advised in their report that 
there had been “possibly numerous violations of intercept procedures.”  According to the U.S. 
officials, the FAP had given no radio warnings or warning shots before engaging the target 
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aircraft.  Early in the morning on August 17, the Citation had detected an aircraft whose behavior 
fit the intelligence at hand, and previous intercepts.  In interviews following the accident, the 
HNR said he followed the standard written script to request authorization from the VI RAT 
Commander when the target aircraft took evasive maneuvers and warning shots were requested, 
but was surprised when the VI RAT Commander replied “proceed to Phase III and neutralize 
it.”151  This use of the new language “neutralize” apparently alarmed the HNR, as it was not 
standard terminology in the intercept script.  The HNR passed the shootdown command to the 
Tucano pilot, and the target was shot down.  However, the U.S. CIA OIC at the time told a 
different story, stating that Phases I and II were not authorized by the VI RAT Commander.  
Moreover, the command was for the Tucano to “neutralize” the target on the ground after it had 
landed.152  During the intercept, there were numerous violations, including no identification of 
the suspect plane before the request by the HNR for Phases I and II, no attempted radio warning, 
no attempted visual warning, no authorization from the VI RAT Commander for Phases I and II 
(along with the atypical “neutralize” language).  As mentioned, the procedures to attack the 
target raised alarm, including in the notification to the U.S. Congress.  In the CIA’s cable 
regarding the event on August 21, the OIC reported that “to the best of our understanding, this is 
a deviation from established procedures for ground strafing…the Tucano pilot apparently strafed 
the target aircraft on the ground per VI RAT Commander’s orders and advised this fact over the 
radio (VHF)… .”153  
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Upon further review at the Embassy in Lima, it was conclude that the suspected plane 
was in fact a narcotrafficker, the shootdown occurred because of failure by the VI RAT 
Commander to use familiar terminology, there was miscommunication between the HNR and the 
Tucano pilot, and the Tucano pilot failed to follow established procedures.  While 
acknowledging the violations, the U.S. Ambassador determined there was not a need to address 
the issue beyond the specific VI RAT Commander and in country team.154  Moreover, while the 
CIA reported the violations during this specific shootdown, they also said the August 17 
shootdown had been “a unique exception to normal operations” and the “sole deviation known to 
have occurred in the history of the program,” which as this review and investigation has shown 
by now is simply false.155 Internal CIA emails also show that “everyone was concerned about the 
possibility of the shootdown program ending because procedures were not followed.”156  As a 
result of the heightened sensitivity, there appeared to even be attempted cover-up of the 
deviations from the August 17 shootdown.   
In September 1997, CIA Headquarters officers traveled to Peru to assess ABDP and 
officials met with U.S. and Peruvian participants in the program.  During the visit, the CIA 
program lead said she was not informed the FAP was not performing visual signals during 
ABDP (as had been the case for more than two years since the first shootdown).  Moreover, 
when the CIA program chief met with the VI RAT Commander, apparently she stressed the 
requirement to conduct visual signals, and that “all procedures had to be followed to ensure 
against the loss of innocent life, that the primary objective of the ABDP was force down and 
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prosecution, and that shootdown was a last resort.”157  Also, the CIA visitors explained concern 
for the program and that ABDP would be shut down if intercept procedures were not followed.  
A formal Congressional Notification was made in October 1997 following the CIA’s visit to 
Peru to look at the deviations in procedure.  The notification reiterated that this had been the only 
deviation in the program so far since inception, and that corrective measures would be taken.  
Moving forward, the U.S. Embassy in Lima established a country team review for all future 
shootdowns, but no changes were made to the actual conduct or procedures of the intercepts, and 
the patterns continued.158   
Even while the previous shootdown was being presented to Congress and the U.S. 
National Security Council as a “unique case,” the twelfth shootdown happened on October 6, 
1997.  The intercept took place at night near a narcotrafficking airstrip, with an A-37 shooting 
down a suspect trafficker.  However, many of the same deviations noted in previous shootdowns 
occurred again—there was no positive identification of the target aircraft as a narcotrafficker, no 
visual warnings, only one attempted radio warning, no indication of warning shots, and phases 
being order before authorization (the HNR told the A-37 to proceed to Phase II… then asked VI 
RAT for authorization.  This happened again with Phase III). 159 Also, once again the shootdown 
was rushed, with only 76 seconds elapsing between first sighting of the target by the A-37 and 
the shootdown order.  The CIA team in Peru reported, as they had before, that, “all intercept 
procedures were followed to the letter.” 160  This is alarming, considering the outcry and 
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investigation of the previous shootdown from just two months earlier, and the ongoing 
notifications to U.S. Congress and the attention on the program and required and reiterated 
procedures. 
The next week, on October 12, 1997, the thirteenth shootdown took place.  Once again 
there are violations that can be observed by a review of the video, including warning shots being 
fired before the target aircraft’s registration was confirmed, lack of evasive maneuvers by the 
target aircraft, no visual signals, and no evidence of warning shots on video (which may have 
been due to the daylight and difficulty seeing tracer rounds).161  Despite the repeated violations, 
once again, perhaps coming as no surprise, the CIA report stated the “required intercept 
procedures” were completed. 
After the two shootdowns in October 1997, no shootdowns took place for approximately 
two and a half years. Why was this the case? While the official record does not provide explicit 
details why the governments assessed this to be the case (the ABDP continued to remain 
operational and in place), a logical explanation seems to be that narcotraffickers were simply 
flying far less compared to pre-ABDP levels.  In other words, ABDP was actually working 
effectively as a deterrent, or at least likely contributing, and interrupting trafficking routes and 
methods.  For example, in April 2000, the Institute for Defense Analysis for the DoD released a 
study called Deterrence Effects and Peru's Force-Down/Shoot-Down Policy: Lessons Learned 
for Counter-Cocaine Interdiction Operations and concluded that interdiction rates of the 
trafficking flights in Peru deterred air trafficking to less than ten percent of its pre-1995 levels.162  
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Paired with other coca eradication efforts from the GOP, coca cultivation in Peru also decreased 
from an estimated 115,300 hectares in 1995 to fewer than 35,000 hectares in 2000.163  While 
ABDP alone cannot be credited for the huge decrease during those years, it likely had a 
contributing effect in Peru, and forced narcotraffickers to find new methods of transports (by 
boat, for example), and different trafficking routes.   
Meanwhile, ABDP did not seem to have the same deterrent effect for coca production in 
Colombia.  For example, during the same time period, from 1995 and 2000, Colombia actually 
experienced a substantial increase in coca cultivation, from approximately 51,000 hectares to 
more than 135,000 hectares.164  While this thesis will remain focused on the topic of ABDP in 
Peru, the difference with Colombia might have been due to limited government eradication 
efforts and influence in territory controlled by the FARC and ELN, for example.  The inverse in 
production rates between the two countries during that time period also meant that Colombian 
narcotraffickers needed Peruvian coca paste far less than before if there was an increase in 
homegrown coca supply.  Regardless, it appeared, at least for Peru, narcotrafficker flight rates 
decreased during ABDP, and this meant fewer opportunities for shootdowns.   
Of note, during the lull in shootdowns there were new standard operating procedures 
written for ABDP in Peru in 1999 to emphasize safety of flight following a near collision of a 
FAP aircraft and the U.S. Citation in February 1999 when the two aircraft briefly touched in the 
air.165 There were no reported damages, but it caused a reevaluation of safety.  Of note, 
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references to visual signals were omitted from the 1999 standard operating procedures (this 
requirement had already been removed from the 1997 standard operating procedures as well).166 
The fourteenth and penultimate shootdown happened on July 17, 2000, during daylight 
hours beginning at 11:21 a.m. with the shootdown by a FAP Tucano at 11:39 a.m.  Once again, a 
post-event analysis shows the usual string of procedural violations including failure to identify 
the suspect aircraft, no visual signals, no evidence of warning shots, and lack of responsible time 
for the suspect plane to respond—just 45 seconds passed between authorization for Phase I and 
Phase II—which would not be enough time for visual warning signals.  Further, fewer than two 
minutes passed in total between the authorizations of Phases I and III for shootdown.  In this 
instance, the U.S. crew also intervened in the chain of command, which was not authorized, as 
they continued to direct the HNR to seek authorization to move to the next Phase.  The CIA 
cables following the shootdown said “all intercept steps were taken” and “established procedures 
were correctly followed… The aircrews quickly, efficiently, and correctly complied with all 
Phases of the rules of engagement.”167  Once again, procedures were shaky at best, and it is as if 
the CIA and FAP had learned nothing during the five years of the program about taking all 
necessary measures to prevent loss of life.  The next shootdown would mean the end of ABDP in 
Peru.  
3.2. The Critical Event – Missionary Plane shot down on April 20, 2001 
So how did the events unfold during the April 20, 2001, shootdown of the Association of 
Baptists for World Evangelism (ABWE) Cessna floatplane, tail number OB-1408, that was 
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piloted by Kevin Donaldson and carrying the Bowers family? And most importantly what went 
wrong?  The following section examines the timeline of events of the fifteenth and final intercept 
and shootdown in Peru under ABDP, while examining critical moments of failure in adherence 
to protocol and communication problems.  Most importantly, the fifteenth shootdown was the 
culmination and climax of a program in Peru that suffered a historic pattern of errors and flaws 
since its inception—patterns already established during the first fourteen shootdowns.   
First, the events leading to the fateful shootdown on April 20 really physically began with 
the flight preparation procedures by the pilot of the missionary aircraft, Kevin Donaldson, on 
April 17.  On that day, Donaldson faxed a notification to the Peruvian Ministry of Transportation 
and Communication in Lima of his planned flight from Iquitos, Peru to Islandia, a Peruvian town 
by the tri-border area of Peru, Colombia, and Brazil.168 Based on interviews with Donaldson, and 
the missionary Jim Bowers, the stated purpose of the trip was to travel to Leticia, Colombia, to 
the U.S. Consulate there in order for the ABWE missionaries, the Bowers family, to obtain a 
Peruvian residency visa for their newly adopted seven month old daughter, Charity.  Also along 
for the trip was the Bowers’ six-year-old son, Cory.  The flight plan submitted by Donaldson, 
including the requirement for the ABWE aircraft to stay near Leticia overnight on April 19, 
followed Peruvian law.169   
Kevin Donaldson had flown in Peru as a missionary pilot since 1989, and had flown that 
specific ABWE floatplane since 1995.  He was also familiar with the Islandia to Iquitos flight, 
having taken the route before.170  Prior to this specific flight in April 2001, Donaldson had also 
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undergone the required annual Peruvian pilot recertification process less than two months earlier.  
Of note, during that specific recertification process, there was no mention of the prohibited 
ADIZ, nor the Peruvian policy of shooting down suspected narcotrafficking aircraft.171  
However, after the fact, Donaldson stated that he was vaguely aware that such a policy existed 
and knew from first hand experience that U.S. personnel flew a Citation in the area for a 
counternarcotics mission.  He stated during an interview with the U.S. government that he 
recalled being trailed by the Citation on a previous flight, although Peruvian aircraft had not 
intercepted him during that event.172  
As required by Peruvian law, Donaldson’s standard procedures involved faxing a copy of 
his flight plan from his home to the AIS-AERO office at Iquitos airport.  He attempted to do this 
on April 18, but was unable to send the fax. Instead, he contacted the Iquitos airport AIS-AERO 
office by phone and orally relayed the flight plan for the trip, which in accordance with Peruvian 
procedures was an acceptable form of filing a flight plan.173  On April 19, he contacted the 
Iquitos airport via VHF radio and was cleared for takeoff with the four members of the Bowers 
family on board.  He stayed in contact with the Iquitos tower for about fifty miles, which was 
close to the limit for the tower’s VHF radio transmission range.  Once outside of the Iquitos 
tower’s VHF radio range, Donaldson switched to a HF frequency to have contact with his wife at 
home in case of an in-flight emergency over the jungle, which was mostly outside of Peruvian air 
traffic control range.  By all accounts, the April 19 flight to Islandia was uneventful. The Bowers 
family successfully crossed into Leticia, Colombia that day and accomplished the required visa 
paperwork for their daughter Charity, as planned.  The return flight, however, seemed doomed 
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from the beginning in a series of events that fault both repeated failures in ABDP by officials 
from both the U.S. and Peru, combined with the perfect storm of weather and miscommunication 
problems.   
On the morning of April 20, Donaldson and the Bowers family prepared to depart in OB-
1408 for their return flight to Iquitos.  According to an interview with Donaldson, he became 
worried about weather and its possible impact on flight conditions.174  The flight took off at 9:39 
a.m. local time, but Donaldson initially kept the aircraft low at approximately 1,000 feet due to
the cloud cover.175  Because of the low altitude and weather, Donaldson was unable to contact 
the Leticia airport on his VHF radio, which essentially failed to trigger an active return flight 
plan for OB-1408 – a key factor that would later prove fatal.   
Kevin Donaldson eventually climbed to 4,000 feet to clear the weather and switched to 
the HF radio to attempt to call his wife but was unable to make contact due to what he called 
technical difficulties.  Per his standard procedures for personnel safety and emergency contact 
with his wife, he left his radio on HF—another important tragic twist of irony and foreboding.  
Upon takeoff, OB-1408 briefly flew into Brazilian airspace, as is common for flights out of 
Islandia due to the proximity to the border.  That means that after takeoff, OB-1408 would have 
to turn back toward Peru to continue its flight.  Donaldson then flew to the convergence of the 
Javari and Amazon Rivers before turning north toward the Peruvian town of Caballococha.  At 
this point the flight turned east and followed the river toward Iquitos.  This flight path allowed 
Donaldson to maintain proximity to the river in case of an emergency landing.   
Meanwhile, at approximately 9:00 a.m., the CIA Citation tracker aircraft had already 
taken off to conduct a counternarcotics patrol mission. Based on a post-event review of operating 
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procedures, training slides, witness interviews, and site visits, as was standard practice at the 
time, the Citation crew was composed of two pilots (both U.S. citizens), a mechanic and sensor 
operator (also both U.S. citizens) and the FAP host nation rider (HNR) who was meant to be a 
specialist in air defense.176  The Citation went to patrol the Caballococha area based on earlier 
Peruvian intelligence reports from the past two weeks that indicated possible narcotrafficking 
flights in that area.177  Of note, on April 19, the day before, the Citation had detected a twin-
engine floatplane in the same zone by the tri-border that fit the flight pattern associated with 
narcotrafficking aircraft.178  While previous intelligence and observation by the CIA and FAP 
would suggest that narcotrafficking was indeed likely in this area, the CIA investigation in 2008 
makes it clear that ultimately there was “no intelligence indicating the presence of a 
narcotraffickers;” that is to say, further analysis shows the cuing intelligence was certainly not 
conclusive.179 
At approximately 9:40 a.m., the Citation detected OB-1408 by the Peru-Brazil border, 
heading toward Peruvian airspace, which was not recognized as being OB-1408’s immediate 
turn following take-off from Islandia – common practice from that flight origin.  The Citation 
considered OB-1408 to be an “aircraft of interest” and proceeded to approach the Cessna from 
176 Some U.S. government documents, particularly the DoS report, refer to the Host Nation Rider (HNR) on board 
the surveillance aircraft as the Host Country Rider (HCR); for purposes of this paper, HNR will be used instead, as 
the crew position is exactly the same, especially considering the most recent government publication on the 
program, the 2008 CIA investigation report, call the position the HNR.   
177 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 6. 
178 See note 162 above.  
179 CIA, Report of Investigation, 114.  
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behind and position itself 1.5 miles back while attempting to positively identify the aircraft.180  
The Citation continued to monitor the aircraft.   
At 9:57 a.m., after some observation, the Citation pilots decided to not approach OB-
1408 any closer in order to visually acquire the aircraft’s registration number on the tail, 
worrying that a closer approach may alert the OB-1408 and cause it to escape into Brazilian 
airspace, thus prohibiting further pursuit.  On the video (screenshot below) the Citation pilot is 
heard saying “you know, we can go up and attempt the tail number, but the problem with that: if 
he is dirty and he detects us, he makes a right turn immediately and we can’t chase him.”181 
Figure 6: 09:57 a.m., Citation pilot talking to HNR, not wanting to approach OB-1408 to 
visually identify it fearing it will flee (screenshot from CIA Citation video obtained by ABC 
News).182 
180 See note above. 
181 ABC News Nightline, “CIA Video of Missionary Plane Shootdown,” ABC News, February 3, 2010, 
https://abcnews.go.com/International/video/cia-shoots-missionary-plane-9733289  
182	ABC News Nightline, “CIA Video of Missionary Plane Shootdown,” ABC News, February 3, 2010. 
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Meanwhile, after being alerted by the HNR, the FAP Officer in Command at the VI RAT 
Post in Pucallpa consulted with the National Air Defense Information Center in Lima, the 
Aircraft Control Center of Air Group No. 42 that maintains liaison authority with the Iquitos 
control tower, and the Santa Clara FAP Base located at the Iquitos airport, and also with Air 
Group No. 3, in order to rule out the track as another authorized FAP aircraft in the zone.  The 
IV/RAT Command Post then relayed back to the Citation’s HNR that based on data available 
there was no recorded flight plan for an aircraft in that area.  Thus, OB-1408 was designated a 
“suspect aircraft.”183  At approximately 10 a.m., during the identification process, personnel at 
the Santa Clara FAP base in Iquitos asked the Iquitos control tower for specific information 
about OB-1408, since it was known that the aircraft had departed a day earlier for an overnight 
trip to Islandia.  However, the Iquitos control tower had no further information regarding OB-
1408, and assumed that the aircraft was still in Islandia.  Of note, this conversation regarding the 
questioning of the whereabouts of OB-1408 was not relayed back to the VI RAT Command 
Center in Pucallpa.   
At 10:01 a.m., the HNR told the Citation pilots that he believed it necessary for a FAP A-
37 interceptor aircraft to be launched from Iquitos, and the U.S. pilots agreed.  The HNR gave 
the FAP Officer in Command at VI RAT the coordinates of the suspect aircraft, OB-1408, and 
the FAP Command General at VI RAT approved of the launching of the interceptor.  The A-37 
launch approval was relayed back to the Citation at 10:05 a.m.  Also, as part of mission control 
procedures, the Citation pilots reported the aircraft data of the suspect aircraft to the U.S. Joint 
Interagency Task Force – East (JIATF-E) in Key West, Florida, which monitored U.S. mission 
activity.  The suspect aircraft coordinates were also relayed to the U.S. Coordinating Officer at 
183 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 6. 
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the VI RAT Command Post.  Simultaneously, the HNR asked the Citation pilot to describe the 
suspect aircraft for the VI RAT Command Post, and the pilot described the aircraft (in English) 
as a “high-wing aircraft, single-engine, with floats.”184  The Citation pilot provided the same 
information to the U.S. Coordinating Officer at the VI RAT.  However, when the HNR on the 
Citation relayed the information to the FAP Officer in Command in Pucallpa he incorrectly 
described the aircraft (in Spanish) based on the image displayed on the Citation console as a 
“twin-engine, light plane, Twin Otter type, with the capacity for water landings and white in 
color.”  He also made note that he had not seen the registration number of the suspect aircraft.  
Of note, the HNR’s description of the aircraft as having two engines was not corrected by the 
other members of the Citation’s crew, indicating that the crew did not clearly understand the 
Spanish message, or simply that they were not paying attention to the HNR communications.   
The Citation pilot reported to the U.S. Coordinating Officer at the VI RAT that the 
detected aircraft “detoured two or three miles toward Brazilian territory for approximately ten 
minutes before re-entering Peruvian airspace.”  Once again, this could later be explained after the 
incident as a standard route for Donaldson’s OB-1408 after takeoff from Islandia, Peru by the 
Brazil border.  At 10:08 a.m., the U.S. Coordinating Officer, who was assigned to be adjacent 
and coordinate with the FAP officers at the VI RAT Command Post, asked the Citation pilots if 
they knew of communication between the FAP officers and the Command Officer of the VI 
RAT, indicating a lack of direct coordination or communication between the U.S. Coordinating 
Officer and the Peruvian FAP at VI RAT.  The Citation pilot relayed that he did not have that 
information regarding the internal Peruvian communication flow, further indicating the lack of 
communication and interface between the personnel of each nation.  At 10:13 a.m., the Citation 
pilot told the co-pilot on an internal channel, that Phases I and II would not be done unless the 
184 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 7. 
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detected aircraft took evasive action.  The pilot also relayed to the sensor operator operating the 
radar onboard that he would stay behind the suspect aircraft and that it could be a “legal flight,” 
but he was unsure why the aircraft had been in Brazilian airspace.  The CIA pilot stated to the 
HNR in English that “see, I don’t know if this is bandito or if it’s amigo, okay?” with a response 
from the HNR of acknowledgement (reply being “okay”) and a follow-up of “no sé” meaning “I 
do not know,” with another acknowledgement of “okay” from the HNR.185  The pilot then 
suggested to the HNR (again in English) that after conducting Phase I, they should follow the 
suspect aircraft to whether they could get it to land in Iquitos to check identity, before firing any 
weapons.  According to the investigation, the HNR did not understand this message from the 
pilot in English, demonstrating the communication barrier among the crew.186   
Figure 7: 10:13 a.m., Citation pilot expressing uncertainty about identifying OB-1408 as a 
narcotrafficker (screenshot from CIA Citation video obtained by ABC News).187 
185 ABC News Nightline, “CIA Video of Missionary Plane Shootdown,” ABC News, February 3, 2010, 
https://abcnews.go.com/International/video/cia-shoots-missionary-plane-9733289.  
186 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 7. 
187	ABC News Nightline, “CIA Video of Missionary Plane Shootdown.” 
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Figure 8: 10:13 a.m., Citation pilot unsure of OB-1408’s identity (screenshot from CIA Citation 
video obtained by ABC News).188 
 
 
Figure 9: 10:13 a.m., Citation pilot talking to HNR in a broken Spanish-English mix about 
attempting to identify OB-1408 (screenshot from CIA Citation video obtained by ABC News).189 
 
																																								 																				
188	ABC News Nightline, “CIA Video.” 
	
189 See note above.  
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Figure 10: 10:13 a.m., Citation pilot talking to HNR about attempting to identify OB-1408 
before Phase III shootdown procedures (screenshot from CIA Citation video obtained by ABC 
News).190 
At 10:17 a.m., the Citation pilot told the co-pilot, again on internal aircraft 
communications, that the detected aircraft “did not fit the profile” of a narcotrafficking aircraft 
because it was flying too high.  He proceeded to then tell the co-pilot and crew that he would 
leave the identification up to the A-37. However, none of these comments (in English) were 
addressed specifically to the Peruvian HNR.   
190 ABC News Nightline, “CIA Video.”	
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Figure 11: 10:17 a.m., Citation pilots expressing doubt about OB-1408 as a narcotraffickers based on 
its flight profile (screenshot from CIA Citation video obtained by ABC News).191 
At 10:24, the Citation pilot asked the HNR, in English, to request more information from 
the VI RAT command post about the suspected aircraft’s flight plan.  The answer back from the 
HNR to the Citation pilot was that OB-1408 did not have a flight plan.  A few minutes earlier, at 
10:20 a.m., the FAP A-37 interceptor aircraft had taken off from Iquitos and made radio contact 
with the Citation and the A-37 first sighted OB-1408 by 10:35 a.m.192 At 10:36 a.m. the HNR on 
the Citation began to issue three VHF radio warnings meant for Donaldson’s OB-1408, 
beginning with the Iquitos control tower frequency of 124.1 MHz, then on an emergency 
frequency 121.5 MHz, and finally on 126.9 MHz, the designated enroute frequency noted in the 
ABDP standard procedures.  However, at this time, Donaldson’s radio was still tuned to HF for 
191	ABC News Nightline, “CIA Video.” 
192 Of note, the specific timestamps initially reported by the U.S. State Department and Congressional reports vary 
from the final CIA internal investigation published seven years later in 2008.  For purposes of this paper, when there 
is a discrepancy in timeline reporting from the various agencies that cannot be determined from publicly available 
information, the times reported in the CIA investigation will be used, considering it is the most recent official 
government reporting and was a more thorough investigation than the initial reports that came out shortly after the 
2001 shootdown.  
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communication to his wife and he did not hear any warnings.  As a result, the missionary plane 
maintained its flight heading with no reaction or response to the warnings.  Of note, the final 
frequencies used as a warning had been retired from service by the Peruvian civil aviation 
authorities about four years before the shootdown.  Despite this, the ABDPs standard operating 
procedures still listed this retired/useless frequency as one of the contact frequencies – which 
further highlights a flaw in the program, especially considering the gravity of positive 
identification prior to engagement.193  While this would not have made a difference in 
Donaldson’s case, considering he was tuned to HF, if could have affected a different aircraft that 
would not have used this out of date VHF emergency frequency, and reinforces the dangers of 
ABDP’s errors.  
At the 10:38 a.m., the A-37 was able to visually obtain the registration number of OB-
1408.  During Phase I, the A-37 pilots had also reported three times that OB-1408 was reducing 
its speed and making “S-shaped” turns and flying toward a rain front which would suggest an 
evasive action associated with a possible narcotrafficker.  However, post-event analysis and 
interviews with the pilots, including with Donaldson, highlighted that OB-1408’s flight path 
continued to be generally westerly, into Peru, and the “S-turns” followed the path of the river, 
which fit the profile of a floatplane’s safety measures in case an emergency landing was 
required.  Nor had Donaldson apparently noticed the rain front, he was simply continuing to 
follow the path of the river toward Iquitos.194  Moreover, OB-1408 was not flying out of the 
country in the direction of Brazil, as would be expected from a suspicious aircraft.195  The HNR 
193 CIA, Report of Investigation, 115.  
194 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 10. 
195 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 8.  
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informed the FAP OIC that Phase I had been completed with positive identification, and that 
Phase II would be implemented.  The HNR then ordered the A-37 to proceed with warning shots 
at 10:39 a.m.  The A-37 fired warning shots from the right rear and parallel to the direction of the 
intercepted aircraft, firing at least two bursts of tracer ammunition. However, fourteen seconds 
later the A-37 reported that the missionary plane did not respond to the warning shots, and eight 
seconds later the A-37 pilot requested Phase III approval for the shootdown.196  This lack of 
reaction from Donaldson and OB-1408 was likely due to the different speeds of the Cessna 
floatplane and A-37 and its effect on the trajectory of the warning shots.  The missionary aircraft 
was flying at low speed of 115 knots, while the A-37 was flying at its minimum (or stall) speed 
of 130 knots, attempting to maintain its position behind OB-1408.  This meant, that the A-37 had 
to maneuver with its nose pointing up.  This also means that the warning shots were angled up, 
and followed a trajectory away from OB-1408, thus not noted by Donaldson.  
Figure 12: 10:40 a.m., FAP HNR asking Citation pilots about Phase III authorization (screenshot 
from CIA Citation video obtained by ABC News).197 
196 See note above.   
197	ABC News Nightline, “CIA Video.” 
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Figure 13: 10:40 a.m., FAP HNR expressing confidence in identity of OB-1408 as a narcotrafficker 
(screenshot from CIA Citation video obtained by ABC News).198 
At 10:40 a.m., the HNR requested Phase III authorization from VI RAT and within a minute the 
FAP OIC on the ground gave the requested authorization at 10:41 a.m.  This authorization from 
the ground control station was the first instance of this portion of the standard operating 
procedure would be followed.199   
Meanwhile the pilots of the Citation were still not confident that the OB-1408 fit the 
profile of a narcotrafficker, saying on their internal communications to each other that they were 
unsure of the identification.  First, the Citation pilot told the HNR in English that OB-1408 was 
not taking evasive action or trying to escape, to which the HNR responded in English with 
“what?” furthering illustrating a disconnect in communication between the crews.200 The pilots 
198 ABC News Nightline, “CIA Video.” 
199 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 8. 
200 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 9. 
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asked the HNR to ask the A-37 to attempt to reach the missionary plane on radio.  Once again, 
Donaldson did not hear the radio calls.  At 10:44 a.m. the Citation pilot commented that the A-37 
could fly in front of OB-1408 to provide a visual warning, as was required in the standard 
operating procedures.  However, the A-37 did not do so.  Moreover, for some unexplained 
reasoning, at 10:45, seven minutes after initially obtained, the A-37 passed the missionary 
plane’s registration to the FAP OIC, along with another request for Phase III, which 
demonstrated a lag in the process during critical moments of identification.  The FAP Officer in 
Command again immediately approved the Phase III request to authorize the shootdown.   
Finally, after Phase III approval, there is evidence that the target aircraft finally noted the 
military presence. For example, at 10:45, the A-37 reported that the occupants of the missionary 
plane had seen the A-37, saying in Spanish that “he’s seen me, he’s seen me too, but he isn’t 
doing anything.”201  In fact, about this time, Mr. Bowers had first observed the A-37 through his 
window and woke up his son Cory to show him the military aircraft.202 In other words, both the 
A-37 crew and those on the missionary plane recognize this visual identification.  Jim Bowers
told the pilot, Donaldson, about the military aircraft as well, at which point Donaldson began to 
attempt to reach the Iquitos tower via his VHF radio on frequency 124.1, but was still having 
difficulty due to the distance from Iquitos.  Ten seconds later the HNR informed the A-37 for the 
first time that Phase III had indeed been authorized.  Within a minute, the A-37 proceeded with 
Phase III and made its first firing pass at OB-1408 from behind the target, while Donaldson was 
attempting to contact Iquitos.  The Citation pilot and co-pilot are also heard on internal 
communications at this time stating and agreeing in English; “I think we’re making a 
201 CIA, Report of Investigation 116.  
202 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 9. 
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mistake”.203  But at this moment, the process accelerated, leaving little room to slow down or 
stop the shootdown procedures initiated by Phase III.  
Figure 14: 10:45 a.m., Citation pilots expressing doubt about shootdown on internal communications 
(screenshot from CIA Citation video obtained by ABC News).204 
Figure 15: 10:45 a.m., FAP A-37B aircraft seen at bottom left hand corner of screen during its firing 
pass on OB-1408 (screenshot from CIA Citation video obtained by ABC News).205 
203 ABC News Nightline, “CIA Video.” 
204	See note above.  
205 See note above. 
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In fact, Donaldson remarked at 10:46 a.m., “the military is here. I don’t know what they 
want.”206 Donaldson also reported his location at Pebas, a small town northeast of Iquitos, and 
that he was proceeding from Islandia at 4,000 feet above sea level.   
Figure 16: 10:46 a.m., the Citation hears Donaldson communicating with the Iquitos Control Tower 
acknowledging the presence of the FAP interceptor (screenshot from CIA Citation video 
obtained by ABC News).207  
Of note, this was the first official filing of OB-1408’s flight plan to the Iquitos tower on 
record.  The Iquitos control tower acknowledged and responded to OB-1408 and the Citation 
crew overheard the transmission on their VHF radio, a signal that should also indicate that the 
aircraft was not likely a narcotrafficker if it was communicating with the Iquitos airport.208  The 
Iquitos tower inquired about the aircraft’s estimated time of arrival (Donaldson responded that 
they would arrive in Iquitos in approximately 40 minutes).  But the Iquitos tower did not mention 
anything in response about the presence of FAP or military aircraft.  The Citation pilot said to the 
206 CIA, Report of Investigation, 116. 
207	ABC News Nightline, “CIA Video.” 
208 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 10. 
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HNR in English that “he is talking to him” to which the HNR replied, “wait a minute,” 
seemingly occupied with other communications with the A-37 and VI RAT.  
Even with the knowledge at hand, and the Citation’s uncertainty surrounding the identity 
of OB-1408, at this point it would appear too late for the shootdown to be interrupted.  Eleven 
seconds after Donaldson’s radio conversation with the Iquitos tower, and the knowledge and 
hesitation of the Citation pilots, the A-37 pilot remarked, “we’re firing at him; we’re firing at 
him. He’s reducing his speed.” The A-37 fired a three second salvo of ammunition from the 
aircraft’s 7.62-caliber mini-gun.  Even then, five seconds later, at 10:47 a.m., the Citation noted 
that Donaldson was still talking to Iquitos, and appeared to be calmly relaying route information. 
This indicates that the first firing pass by the A-37 a few seconds earlier did not hit the 
missionary aircraft, nor was it noted by the pilot Donaldson.  It was a miss, likely due to the fact 
that the A-37’s gun is not a precision weapon, and it was difficult to aim while the A-37 was 
constantly maneuvering and adjusting to stay behind the slower OB-1408, as previously noted.    
Moreover, the Citation pilots reiterated to the HNR, again in English, that Iquitos “is 
talking to Oscar Bravo” (OB-1408) and the FAP HNR said, “okay, wait a minute.”209  The 
Citation pilots also noted that the Iquitos control tower had begun communicating with the Santa 
Clara FAP Base, a sign they took to suggest that the intercepted OB-1408 would head to the FAP 
base to resolve suspicions.  Moreover, internal communications between the Citation pilots show 
that they understood the mission to have concluded and that the Citation would also head toward 
Iquitos.  The Citation pilot in command asked the HNR if indeed OB-1408 was headed to Santa 
209 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 10. 
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Clara, and once again, likely due to both language barriers and task saturation, the HNR 
appeared to not understand the question, answering with “what?”210 
Jim Bowers also told Donaldson that he had seen puffs of smoke coming from the nose of 
the A-37, indicating he likely observed the shots fired of the first firing pass, which had in fact 
missed.  But within a few seconds it was too late.  The interdiction progressed quickly, and at 
10:48 the A-37 persisted and made another firing pass attempt, and within three seconds of that 
pass Donaldson screamed over the radio to Iquitos in Spanish, “they’re killing me! They’re 
killing us!”211  
Figure 17: 10:48 a.m., after OB-1408 is shot, the pilot Donaldson is heard yelling out “!Van a 
matarme, van a matarnos!” in Spanish, translated above (screenshot from CIA Citation video 
obtained by ABC News).212  
At 10:48, the Citation pilots told the HNR in broken Spanish and English to cease fire, 
and twelve seconds after the time of the second firing pass the HNR tells the A-37 in Spanish 
“Stop! No more! No more, Tucan! No more! The A-37 pilot immediately acknowledged and said 
210 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 11. 
211 CIA, Report of Investigation, 116. 
212	ABC News Nightline, “CIA Video.”	
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in Spanish “roger, we’re terminating, he’s on fire.” 213  The A-37 then reported at 10:50 that OB-
1408 had crash-landed in the river at the coordinates 03° 28 ́ 55" South, 072° 06 ́ 70" West near 
the District of Pebas, specifically the village of Huanta, in the Peruvian state of Loreto.214 
Veronica Bowers and her daughter Charity had been shot and killed on the second firing pass by 
salvo of approximately three seconds, and Kevin Donaldson, the pilot, had been shot in the leg.  
Surprisingly, Jim Bowers and son Cory Bowers were not injured during the shootdown or 
subsequent crash landing in the river, at which point residents of the nearby village are seen 
coming out to the aircraft in a boat to rescue the crew.   
Initial press reports hinted at strafing runs by the A-37 following the crash landing of the 
missionary aircraft, but according to interviews with the missionaries and review of the video, 
this proved to be untrue.  The only civilian eyewitnesses on the ground were two local residents 
of the village near the site of the shootdown, a farmer William Huanquiri Maneo and his wife 
Nelfi Benites Miranda.215  They heard and then saw the aircraft from the ground, reporting that 
they had seen three aircraft.  The pair then watched the burning aircraft come in for a crash 
landing about a kilometer up the river from their property in Huanta.  William Huanquiri went 
out with his father in canoes to the aircraft to rescue Jim and Cory Bowers and Kevin Donaldson 
(which are the aforementioned boats observed in the video).  According to Huanquiri, when they 
arrived at the aircraft in the river, Jim Bowers was already aware that his wife and daughter had 
been killed.216   
213 ABC News Nightline, “CIA Video.” 
214 “Avioneta trasladaba a familia estadounidense,” El Comercio, April 21, 2001, and U.S. State Department, Peru 
Investigation Report, 14. 
215 Javier Medina, “Hidroavión de misioneros sigue sumergido en el río Amazonas,” El Comercio, April 25, 2001. 
216 See note above.  
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Figure 18: 10:50 a.m., OB-1408 is observed crash landing in the river (screenshot from CIA 
Citation video obtained by ABC News).217  
Figure 19: local residents from the community in Huanta taking canoes out to rescue survivors 
of OB-1408; the aircraft is now upside in the river with its floats visible on the video (screenshot 
from CIA Citation video obtained by ABC News).218  
217	ABC News Nightline, “CIA Video.” 
218 See note above.  
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Figure 20. OB-1408’s injured pilot, Kevin Donaldson (center), being transported by boat to 
Iquitos.219 
219 Photo by Francisco Gallo, El Comercio, April 22, 2001. 
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Figure 21. The recovery of OB-1408 from the river; the bullet holes in the tail section and 
burned out fuselage are visible. The aircraft’s registration number is visible on the wing and tail 
section as well.220 
Figure 22: The fatalities from the shootdown—Veronica “Roni” Bowers and daughter 
Charity.221 
220 Photo by Juan Ponce, El Comercio, April 28, 2001. 
221 Photo in El Comercio, April 28, 2001.  
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CHAPTER 4. The Fallout 
4.1. Initial Press Reporting 
The shootdown of the Bowers’ plane immediately triggered press reports and subsequent 
investigations from both the U.S. and Peruvian governments.  The facts slowly unfolded for the 
public, revealing details of the shootdown and the ABDP.  One of Peru’s leading daily 
newspapers, El Comercio, featured the story about the shootdown the following day, on April 21, 
2001, and included a summary of the official FAP statement that was released that night 
concerning the shootdown, in which the FAP acknowledged the fatal shootdown of the 
missionary aircraft, and said that “international norms to control (the aircraft)” were followed, 
and that the FAP would investigate the case in an “exhaustive manner.”222 Another leading 
Peruvian newspaper, La República, also featured the story on April 21, 2001, and even published 
the official version from the FAP in the Comunicado Oficial No. 010-FAP-2001 from the 
Peruvian Minister of Defense. This official communiqué went into further detail about the 
circumstances from the perspective of the FAP and maintained that the shootdown had been a 
“last resort” effort to force the aircraft to land, and that the FAP had followed all international 
procedures set out by the ICAO (the FAP communiqué, in Spanish, is available in the annex).223  
222 “Avioneta trasladaba a familia estadounidense,” El Comercio, April 21, 2001. 
223 Carlos Callegari, “Incidente aéreo en la selva deja dos muertos, un herido y 2 sobrevivientes,” La República, 
April 21, 2001.  
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Figure 23: the location and initial details of the shootdown according La República on April 21, 
2001. Of note, this version of the storyboard does not include the presence of the CIA Citation, 
which would become known and presented later.224 
224 Graphic by Orlando Arauco, La República, April 21, 2001. 
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Figure 24: The approximate routes of OB-1408 (labeled “Cessna 185” above) and of the FAP 
A-37B interceptor aircraft (incorrectly called a “Tucano” above) from its base in Pucallpa,
according to El Comercio newspaper. Of note, the CIA Citation ISR aircraft, also based at
Pucallpa, is not depicted because the full details were not yet known.225
The U.S. Embassy in Lima also announced the immediate suspension of any 
counternarcotics flights until the completion of the investigations of the incident, and said the 
GOP was in agreement.226 News publications had revealed that both Peruvian and U.S. aircraft 
225	El Comercio, April 25, 2001.		
226 “Suspenden vuelos de represión al narcotráfico,” El Comercio, April 21, 2001. 
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took part in counternarcotics missions in Peru, but Peruvian press reporting from the FAP said 
they had “never worked directly with the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States,” but 
since 1996 had been coordinating through an office at the U.S. Embassy, called the Regional 
Administration Office to detect suspected narcotrafficking aircraft.227  This would have likely 
been the cover organization for the CIA ABDP office in Peru.  The spokesman for U.S. Southern 
Command also acknowledged on April 21, 2001, that indeed there had been a non-DoD U.S. 
counternarcotics reconnaissance aircraft near the FAP A-37 during the shootdown, but declined 
to acknowledge that the CIA specifically operated the aircraft. The CIA declined to comment at 
this point. 228 The same day, President George W. Bush, who was attending the Summit of the 
Americas in Quebec, Canada, also lamented the “terrible tragedy” but said that he hoped to 
“know all the information” about the incident before assigning blame.229 Javier Perez de Cuellar, 
the Peruvian Prime Minister at the time, was also attending the summit and expressed his deepest 
condolences to President Bush about the loss of life, and pledged to assist the families of the 
casualties with all resources necessary.230 
On April 22, 2001, the newspapers began reporting the version of the pilot, Donaldson, 
which seemed to conflict the official FAP release.  According to Donaldson, he had filed a valid 
flight plan and his aircraft had a clear tail number and markings that were clearly associated with 
the mission organization.231  The La República newspaper cited a source on April 23 who stated 
227 Javier Medina and Alejandro Reyes, “Hoy rescatarán nave siniestrada del cauce del rio Amazonas,” El Comercio, 
April 25, 2001.  
228 “Confirman que había un avión de EEUU junto al ‘Tucano,’” La República, April 21, 2001.  
229 See note above.  
230 “Perez de Cuellar da condolencias a Bush,” La República, April 23, 2001.  
231 Oscar Chumpitaz, “Piloto de Cessna revela que tenían un plan de vuelo,” La República, April 22, 2001. 
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that Donaldson had made contact with the Iquitos control tower with his flight plan.232 This was 
in fact the case, although the timeline revealed during the CIA investigation later (and discussed 
in the aforementioned chapter of this thesis) showed that Donaldson did verbally file his plan 
with the Iquitos control tower at roughly the same time that the FAP was intercepting OB-1408, 
which proved too late to avoid the shootdown. This was noted by the Citation, but the message 
was not relayed to the FAP A-37 interceptor by the HNR.  In other words, there was a clear 
disconnect in the various versions and perspectives of the event. By April 23, there were also 
press reports that the CIA had indeed been involved in the interdiction program with the FAP in 
Peru for years.233 
Although both governments initially exercised caution in placing blame on a specific side 
for the incident, expressing their condolences while continually reiterating that procedures had 
been followed during the “accident,” soon officials began to attempt to clear their organizations 
of any wrongdoing. However, they presented conflicting accounts.  For example, Commander 
Rommel Roca, the spokesperson for the Peruvian military, said in Spanish, “the only thing that I 
can say is that the Air Force followed their instructions to the letter of the law.”234 Meanwhile, 
when asked about the event the same day the White House Press Secretary, Ari Fleischer, 
indicated that information they had received indicated that norms and procedures had not 
actually been followed.235  
The press, however, did begin to assign blame for the incident, with the New York Times 
publishing an editorial on April 24 that blamed the FAP for the shootdown of OB-1408.  The 
232 “Suspenden patrullaje aéreo,” La República, April 23, 2001. 
233 “!Van a matarnos!,” CNN en Español, April 23, 2001, reprinted in La República the same day. 
234 “Roni y Charity serán sepultadas en Michigan,” La República, April 24, 2001. 
235  See note above.   
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Peruvian Ambassador to the U.S. at the time, Carlos Alzamora, rejected this assertion and called 
these claims presumptions without the support of an investigation.236 Additionally, by April 25, 
international news agencies were reporting that U.S. government officials acknowledged that 
language deficiency "was a factor" in the tragedy.237 However, these initial press reports merely 
scratched the surface for the facts that would be revealed through a series of official 
investigations.  
4.2. Investigations and reports reveal a historical pattern of deviations 
The official aircraft incident report released be the Peruvian Ministry of Transportation 
and Communication (Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones or MTC), presented a 
narrative of the event describing the crash of OB-1408 as a as a result shots to the “vital zones of 
the fuselage” by a General Dynamics GAU-2B/A 7.62mm "minigun", installed on the 
interdiction aircraft, a FAP Cessna A-37B.238  The aircraft incident report also presented 
information regarding the location of the shootdown (which roughly matched later press 
reporting and government investigations,) details on the fatalities and injuries of those on board 
OB-1408, and the following statement that:  
The crew of the A-37B intercepting aircraft and the organization involved and in charge 
of the interdiction of aircraft within Peruvian airspace, headed by the Peruvian Air Force, 
did not comply with the procedures described in Annex Number 2, Chapter 3.8, Appendix 
2, and Annex A of the ICAO (italics mine added for emphasis…. That the crew of the A-
37B and parties involved and in charge of the interception of aircraft within Peruvian air 
space, headed by the Peruvian Air Force, did not comply with the interception 
procedures.239 
236 “Embajador peruano rechaza editorial de New York Times,” La República, April 24, 2001. 
237 “Language 'was a factor' in Peru shootdown,” CNN, April 25, 2001, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/04/25/peru.shootdown.language/ 
238 English translation of the report from the Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones, “Cessna A185E, OB-
1408” April 20, 2001, http://portal.mtc.gob.pe/comision/ciaa/documentos/cessna2.PDF 
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Following the event, the U.S. government established two external review groups to look 
at the conduct and events surrounding the ABDP – a U.S. National Security Council-directed 
Interagency Review Group and the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI).  The 
U.S. Ambassador to Peru at the time, John Hamilton, announced on April 23, 2001, almost 
immediately there would a joint investigation between the United States government and the 
FAP.240  This first investigative team, the Interagency Review Group, was officially formed on 
April 27.  The interagency team was made up of representatives from various U.S. government 
agencies, including representatives from the U.S. DoD and DoS, and the CIA.  The White House 
also designated the U.S. DoS Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (INL), Rand Beers, as the team leader.241  The GOP, announced also 
released a communiqué on April 24 indicating that meetings were taking place with the U.S. 
Embassy in Lima to form the joint team.242  The representatives from the Peruvian side would 
include the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.  The GOP designated FAP Major General 
Jorge Kisic Wagner, the Commander of Operations, as the Peruvian team leader.243 During his 
briefing about this report on August 2, 2001, Beers stated the report was “the product of a joint 
US-Peruvian accident investigation. It includes an examination of documents, interviews of 
239  Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones, “Cessna A185E, OB-1408.” 
240 “Habrá investigación conjunta,” La República, April 23, 2001. 
241 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 1-2.  
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participants, and other relevant individuals, as well as field visits to Iquitos and Pucallpa. 
Cooperation between both sides was very good. Private discussions were quite candid.”244 
The charter of this Joint Investigative Team was to establish the “facts and circumstances, 
including systemic or procedural matters, that contributed to the April 20 interdiction of the U.S. 
missionary floatplane, and the deaths of two U.S. citizens” and to make recommendations, if 
any, to the appropriate U.S. and GOP authorities as to the modifications that might be required to 
minimize a possible repetition of this incident.”245 The joint investigation’s task was to review 
relevant U.S. and Peruvian information related to the ABDP, and it was permitted to “interview, 
but not depose, U.S., Peruvian or other nationals that may have information pertinent to carrying 
out the charter of the joint investigative team.”246 The team was also tasked to review 
counternarcotics procedures and training conducted by U.S. and Peruvian ABDP participants, 
including “written training and procedures guidelines for both the U.S. and Peru” and to 
“determine what protocols, procedures and declarations were in force at the time of the incident, 
and how they were publicly disseminated to alert the Peruvian aviator public of the 
counternarcotics airbridge denial procedures in effect.”247 The team was also permitted to “view 
Peruvian locations to assess field conditions, bilateral working relationships, implementation of 
procedures, and availability and condition of relevant equipment.”248 
244 Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “Special 
Briefing: Joint U.S.-Peruvian Investigation Report of the April 20, 2001 Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Missionary 
Plane,” Washington, D.C., August 2, 2001, 14-15. https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/jun_aug/4407.htm 
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However, the Joint Investigative Team was limited to a very specific fact finding mission 
with a very specific focus.  It was not, for example, authorized to: “make a recommendation or 
determination with regard to the suspension or start-up of counternarcotics aerial intercept 
operations in Peru, question witnesses under oath or receive sworn testimony, or examine 
misconduct or fix blame.”249  The Joint Investigative Team released their report on August 2, 
2001, with Beers giving a briefing and answering questions at the State Department’s 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs on the same day.250 Moreover, the briefing 
stated that the report’s conclusions “are fully shared by both the Peruvians and Americans” and 
was, “jointly drafted by several members of the team and was reviewed by all members of the 
team. In some cases, specific report language may suffer from being a committee draft in two 
languages.”251 The irony in the report is not lost with the mention of linguistic challenges, during 
an investigation into an accident that also resulted from similar linguistic challenges.    
The report made six conclusions, in order of what the team considered to be the primary 
factors contributing to the 2001 shootdown. The first conclusion was that as ABDP progressed 
the full range of agreed-upon procedures from the 1994 MOJ became “less detailed and explicit 
in implementing documents agreed to by representatives of both governments.”252 In other 
words, original agreed-upon protocols were not being properly implemented.  Second, the report 
stated that, “joint training utilized an abbreviated set of procedures, with the assumption that the 
target had been identified as a narcotics trafficking aircraft prior to the arrival of the interceptors” 
and that following the aforementioned collision between U.S. and Peruvian aircraft in February 
249 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 1. 
250 Beers, “Special Briefing: Joint U.S.-Peruvian Investigation,” 1. 
251  U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 1. 
252  U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 14.  
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1999, the focus during intercept training had been on safety of flight.253  That is to say, the 
intercept protocol was not fully followed because of a rushed and incorrect assumption about the 
identity of OB-1408. Moreover, because of concerns over safety of the interceptor due to the 
collision, the A-37 did not approach OB-1408 for visual signals.   
Third, the report stated that the parties involved in the OB-1408 shootdown, stayed 
within their individual stove-piped command and control roles and did not consider a broader 
“overall perspective.”254 In this regard, the U.S. and Peruvian crewmembers were actually 
following established protocol, and the Citation pilots did not issue orders, intervene, or interrupt 
for example (which had been seen in previous shootdowns).  However, the single point of 
coordination, and ultimately failure, was the HNR, who was clearly task saturated during the 
mission. Fourth, “the characteristics of the flight of Peruvian civil aircraft OB-1408 on April 20, 
2001, generated suspicion within the Peru-U.S. counternarcotics aircraft interdiction system that 
it was a narcotics trafficking aircraft.”255 This was despite that the fact that OB-1408 did not 
attempt to evade the A-37 interceptor, maintained a steady altitude throughout the intercept, and 
was flying into Peru, toward Iquitos, not toward Brazil as would have been the standard case for 
a narcotraffickers loaded with Peruvian coca paste.  Thus, point four of this report is inconsistent 
with critical analysis of the flight characteristics.   
Fifth, and as highlighted in the discussion over language capability challenges and the 
weight of HNR responsibility, that “language limitations of Peruvian and American participants 
– particularly under stress – played a role in reducing the timely flow of information, and
253 U.S. State Department, Peru Investigation Report, 14. 
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comprehension of decisive messages related to the April 20 interception of OB-1408.”256  The 
language and communication flow challenges were a pattern that emerged in previous intercepts 
as well, and that were a major lesson learned from the ABDP. In his briefing on the final report, 
Beers mentioned the language challenges in just conducting the investigation and review itself, 
stating “the English and Spanish language differences cause many or most of the non-native 
speakers to not understand conversations in the other language. And even if you here a ‘yes’ in 
response to that conversation, that does not mean that the person actually understood what was 
said to him if it was not said in his native language.”257  Finally, sixth, and similar to the fifth 
conclusion point, “communications systems overload, and cumbersome procedures played a role 
in reducing timely and accurate compliance with all applicable directives by participants in the 
air and on the ground.”258  This conclusion echoes what was previously stated by the report, and 
is a pattern that emerged from the onset of the program.   
Glaringly perhaps, the rapid investigation by the Joint Investigative Team, with its 
limited scope and conclusions released just barely more than three months after the shootdown, 
does not really scratch the surface on the systematic errors over the years of the ABDP.  
Moreover, as discussed later, the CIA would reveal that complete ABDP information had been 
withheld from the investigation. Still, the report rapidly identified some serious issues that 
emerged, specifically about the inconsistencies in protocol and communication challenges that 
led to the fatal shootdown of Kevin Donaldson and the Bowers family.  Additionally, the report 
briefing ended with a statement by Beers that contradicted some early press reporting that 
256 See note above.  
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attempted to quickly assign blame for the shootdown, stating “because there have been press 
reports suggesting otherwise, the team did not conclude that the floatplane pilot, Donaldson, was 
at fault. The intercept procedures followed by both governments should be robust enough to 
prevent such an accident.”259 However, the government investigations did not stop here.    
The U.S. SSCI also began its own investigation through a series of hearings, briefings, 
and reviews, which differed from the first investigation in that it did not include inputs from the 
Peruvian side.  Nor was the investigation comprised of interagency representatives.  As 
presented in its October 2001 report on its investigation, the SSCI held one closed hearing and a 
closed briefing concerning the shootdown, beginning on April 24, 2001, with testimony from 
George Tenet, Director of the CIA.260  Next, on May 10, Senate Committee members and staff 
met to view the videotape and transcript of the 2001 shootdown, and received a briefing by CIA 
officials. Then, on July 26, the Committee staff received an on-the-record briefing, which 
summarized the results of the aforementioned Joint Investigative Team report.261  During the 
SSCI investigation, Committee staff conducted interviews with personnel from: the CIA, 
including the crew of the Citation tracker aircraft, the DoS, the DoD, the USCS, the DEA, the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the FAP, Peru's aeronautical agency and the 
missionaries from the ABWE, including interviews with Kevin Donaldson Jim Bowers, and 
ground personnel in Peru. The Peruvian authorities did not permit Committee staff to interview 
the FAP HNR, the A-37 pilots, the FAP OIC on the day of shootdown, or the Commanding 
General of the VI RAT who authorized the shootdown. According to the Senate report, the FAP 
259 Beers, “Special Briefing: Joint U.S.-Peruvian Investigation,” 2. 
260 U.S. SSCI, Review of United States Assistance, 1. 
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denied the interview request because there are “pending judicial proceedings against the 
Peruvian pilots and the host nation rider.”262 
The U.S. SSCI issued a slew of conclusions that greatly expanded on the findings of the 
Joint Investigative Team from a couple months earlier, even taking steps to assign what they 
viewed as culpability and systematic flaws in ABDP: 1) the pilot Kevin Donaldson was not to 
blame and that OB-1408 was flying a route and altitude that was not consistent with typical 
narcotrafficking patterns; 2) there was an erosion of protocol, training, and safety procedures put 
in place to “protect innocent life” and the “presumption of innocence should have been 
paramount;” 3) the Peruvian HNR and his FAP chain-of-command “showed a tragic lack of 
judgment in the April 20, 2001 incident;” 4) The Peruvian air traffic control system is “clearly 
inadequate to fulfill this mission with the requisite level of confidence;” 5) The “inadequate 
language skills of both the Peruvian and American participants contributed to the overall 
confusion on April 20;” 6) the communications architecture was “cumbersome and delayed the 
efficient flow of information;” 7) the FAP is “ill-equipped to conduct this program in an 
effective and safe manner;” 8) the ABDP procedures “removed the US participants from the 
decision making process” and only the “Peruvians had the authority to order a shootdown;” 9) 
the U.S. government did not have adequate oversight of ABDP, “contributing to the degradation 
of adherence to safety procedures;” 10) ABDP in Peru made a “significant difference in the fight 
against cocaine trafficking, but it is possible that similar results could have been achieved in Peru 
with a different mix of counter-drug policies;” and finally, 11) Peru’s coca cultivation and its 
threat to national security had “changed dramatically since the program began in 1994” and this 
262 U.S. SSCI, Review of United States Assistance, 1. 
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was not adequately assessed by those responsible for ABDP oversight.263  These conclusions, 
explicitly without the input of the GOP or the FAP, cast most of the operational blame on the 
Peruvian side, especially regarding problems with the FAP’s chain of command and systems, 
while effectively blaming U.S. personnel for ineffective oversight of ABDP.  Through its 
conclusions, the Senate report then presented four recommendations, including a periodic U.S. 
Presidential review and recertification process of an air interdiction program like ABDP, that 
ABDP in Peru should not be resumed until both governments take steps to address the 
shortcomings outlined in the conclusions that were reached, including improved training (such as 
the responsibility for providing Spanish-speaking crewmembers on the part of the U.S.) and 
strict adherence to protocol, a greater emphasis on the role of law enforcement in the 
counternarcotics fight as opposed to military enforcement, and the call to transfer such 
responsibilities away from the CIA to other government agencies, especially in light of the 
publicity that accompanied the 2001 incident.264  
In the meantime, and not publicly realized at the time, while the other U.S. and Peruvian 
investigations were ongoing, the CIA had begun its own internal review through its Peru Task 
Force (PTF). Later the CIA Inspector General report showed that pertinent CIA information was 
actually withheld from the Joint Investigative Team and from the SSCI.  According to the CIA 
Inspector General report, no evidence was found that the PTF findings were ever shared outside 
the CIA internal review with these external, joint government investigation groups. In fact, by 
actively telling the outside Joint Investigative Team that there was no final report from the 
internal CIA investigation, the joint investigation was essentially denied access to detailed PTF 
263 U.S. SSCI, Review of United States Assistance, 28-29. 
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findings.265  This meant that the aforementioned joint and Senate investigation reports contained 
an incomplete picture of the ABDP and history. The concealment about the PTF’s findings also 
denied a complete picture of the events in 2001 to the victims of the shootdown, who were at the 
time engaged in civil settlement negotiations. The U.S. Government had paid $8 million to the 
Kevin Donaldson and Jim Bowers based on the CIA's inaccurate assertion that the missionary 
shootdown had been an abnormality in a program that had otherwise always complied with the 
Presidentially mandated, and jointly-agreed upon procedures.266  In other words, the initial 
official stance was that the 2001 shootdown was an outlier—and not the culmination of years 
and patterns of errors and neglect of protocol.  
By the end of May 2001, the PTF presented internal CIA evidence and documented its 
findings that the procedures required by the MOJ had never been fully followed during ABDP 
and that CIA officers running the program in Peru had falsely claimed otherwise in their reports 
to CIA Headquarters. The PTF did not formally report this, however, to the other government 
investigations, nor did the information initially become public knowledge.267  In general, the PTF 
sought to shield the CIA officers and organization from any finding of accountability or liability 
for their conduct of the program by not releasing a public report, and by telling the government 
investigatory groups working in parallel, such as the Joint Investigative Team and the SSCI, that 
there was no final report. This was a cover-up of the facts that would later be publically revealed 
by the 2008 CIA Inspector General report.268 
265 CIA, Report of Investigation, 8-9. 
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So then, what led to the eventual 2008 CIA Inspector General report, and the revelation 
of the ground truth and more complete picture of ABDP’s systematic problems? During the 
multiple ongoing government investigations into ABDP following the 2001 shootdown, the U.S. 
DoJ’s Criminal Division initiated its own inquiries and review of the shootdown to see if 
criminal charges might be warranted.  In mid-December 2001, the DoJ team approached the FBI 
and the CIA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to form another investigative team, with a 
focus on determining possible violations and culpability.269 Thus, the OIG formed a team of six 
special investigators and a research assistant, in conjunction with 10 special agents from the FBI, 
six prosecutors and one paralegal from the DoJ’s Criminal Division, and one Assistant United 
States Attorney from the District of Columbia.270 This team obtained copies of relevant U.S. 
Government records, including copies of relevant internal and external documents, including 
Official Personnel Folders, correspondence, communications, reports, and electronic files.  
Moreover, the team examined CIA policies, regulations, and field directives, as well as the 
aforementioned PD and MOJ, which had established ABDP.271 The team asked permission to 
review transcripts of Congressional testimonies, hearings, and briefings presented by CIA 
officers to both the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the SSCI.  
While the U.S. House Committee declined to provide access to the requested material, stating 
that its own review had determined that the actions within ABDP were appropriate, the Senate 
Committee provided the requested materials.272  The investigative team also requested and 
reviewed pertinent documents in the records of the Departments of State, Commerce, and 
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Defense as well as the DEA and the U.S. Customs Service (USCS).  They also traveled to the 
U.S. Southern Command’s Joint Interagency Task Force-East and the U.S. Embassy in Lima in 
order to conduct interviews of officials assigned to the Embassy during the ABDP. Additionally, 
the team travelled to the cities of Pucallpa and Piura, Peru, for further interviews with those 
involved with ABDP.  Finally, the team requested and received classified and unclassified 
Peruvian Government documents pertinent to the conduct of the interception program.273 
The aforementioned investigation would be the most thorough examination of both the 
2001 shootdown and the complete history of the ABDP.  In total, the team reportedly reviewed 
more than 250,000 pages of documents, obtained and reviewed the videotapes of ABDP 
operations, which provided a visual and audio record of what transpired in each intercept 
mission, directed more than 210 interviews, including with current and former employees of the 
CIA, DEA, USCS, DoS, the National Security Council (NSC), the U.S. Army, and the U.S. 
Senate staff, and collaborated with the Peruvian Ministries of Justice, Defense, and Foreign 
Affairs. 274 The team also met with the Commander of the FAP and other Peruvian Ministry of 
Defense officials, and arranged interviews of FAP personnel involved in ABDP.  In total, the 
CIA OIG team interviewed 24 FAP officers, including five of the six commanding generals for 
ABDP, as well as available FAP pilots, co-pilots, and HNRs. 275  
Overall, the exhaustive now-declassified (yet, still partly redacted) OIG report, much of 
which is the primary source documentation for this thesis, provides an up-close look at the 
historical evolution of ABDP and its patterns of deviations, as well as an acknowledgment of 
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noncompliance with the criteria set out in the original MOJ and PD.  Throughout the 
investigation, the OIG highlighted the patterns of discrepancies of the ABDP and the inconsistent 
findings of the CIA’s PTF, which had not been previously reported.  For example, the OIG 
showed that the PTF’s previously unreleased findings showed that through interviews of U.S. 
and Peruvian aircrews, “the requirement to visually warn suspect aircraft had not been conducted 
in shootdowns from 1995 through 2001.”276 Moreover, despite earlier reports in interviews, the 
PTF had determined that neither the February 1997 nor the 1999 SOPs instructed the aircrews to 
exercise the required ICAO visual signals as part of FAP intercept procedures.277 
On August 25, 2008, the CIA Inspector General, John L. Helgerson, presented the 
findings of the report to the Director of the CIA at that time, General Michael Hayden, and 
concluded that all of the CIA members who participated in ABDP were aware that the program 
was not being conducted in accordance with the stated requirements, even though the Agency 
had consistently told the U.S. Congress the National Security Council that the ABDP was 
operating within the policies that governed it, and misled other government investigations in 
hearings following the 2001 shootdown: 
All of the key Agency participants in the ABDP who were identified in this Report were 
aware that the ABDP was not being conducted in accordance with the requirements of 
PD 95-9 and the MOJ. This awareness was demonstrated in the details provided in 
reporting cables, Videotape reviews, and reports from pilots. Visual signals were required 
by the MOJ, but had not been conducted in any of the ABDP shootdowns. Between 
March 1995 and April 2001, however, each of these Agency officers failed to report 
violations of this requirement or any of the others. Instead, they consistently and falsely 
reported the opposite-that the program was being operated in full compliance with the 
requirements.278 
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Moreover, the OIG report concluded that, “violations of procedures required under the ABDP to 
intercept and shoot down drug trafficking aircraft occurred in all of the shootdowns in which 
CIA participated, beginning in May 1995,” and that during many cases aircraft had been shot 
down, “within two to three minutes of being sighted by the Peruvian fighter – without being 
properly identified, without being given the required warnings to land, and without being given 
time to respond to such warnings as were given to land.”279  
The OIG report also officially revealed that criminal prosecution of those U.S. officials 
involved in ABDP had been declined in favor of administrative action.  In the fall of 2004, the 
U.S. DoJ had indicated that it would not prosecute CIA officers involved in the ABDP if the 
“CIA could assure an adequate administrative remedy.”280 Thus, in October 2004, the CIA 
provided the requested assurances in a letter to the DoJ, and the DoJ officially declined criminal 
prosecution in February 2005.281  While the OIG investigation outlines the specific roles of each 
CIA member involved in the ABDP, the names are not publicly available. In December 2008, 
after reviewing the investigation report, CIA Director Hayden convened an Agency 
Accountability Board to determine if officials should be further punished.282 
Unclassified portions of the OIG report were made public for the first time on November 
20, 2008, by U.S. Congressman, Representative Pete Hoekstra, the top Republican on the House 
of Representatives Intelligence Committee, who criticized the CIA for the “needless” deaths and 
stated, “this issue goes to the heart of the American people’s ability to…know that agencies 
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given the power to operate on their behalf aren’t abusing that power or their trust.”283  Of note, 
Representative Hoekstra had a vested interest in the case, as the Bowers family came from his 
Congressional district in the state of Michigan.284  Congressman Hoekstra spent years advocating 
for more of the OIG report to be publicly released. During that time, there were a series of press 
reports on the culpability of the CIA involved, to which the CIA Office of Public Affairs 
responded with on February 3, 2010, deflecting blame to the Peruvian side:  
The program to deny drug traffickers an ‘air bridge’ ended in 2001 and was run by a 
foreign government. CIA personnel had no authority either to direct or prohibit actions by 
that government. CIA officers did not shoot down any airplane. In the case of the tragic 
downing of April 21st, 2001, CIA personnel protested the identification of the missionary 
plane as a suspect drug trafficker… The Board also determined that "reasonable 
suspicion"—the basis on which to identify a plane as suspect—was established in every 
shootdown except that of April 21st, 2001, when, tragically, innocent lives were lost. The 
Board concluded that no CIA officer acted inappropriately with respect to the 2001 
shootdown…This program, now long over, has been looked at very carefully, inside and 
outside the CIA. The Agency has briefed the oversight committees of Congress on the 
actions the Agency has taken in this matter. Any talk of a cover-up, let alone improper 
attempts to persuade the Department of Justice not to pursue prosecutions, is flat wrong. 
This was a tragic episode that the Agency has dealt with in a professional and thorough 
manner. Unfortunately, some have been willing to twist facts to imply otherwise. In so 
doing, they do a tremendous disservice to CIA officers, serving and retired, who have 
risked their lives for America's national security.285 
Despite the evidence, and subsequent investigation, the CIA has maintained it acted 
appropriately throughout ABDP, specifically regarding the 2001 shootdown.  However, through 
Hoekstra’s efforts, and continued journalistic investigations, the full OIG report was finally 
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https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/world/americas/21inquire.html 
285	“Statement from the CIA on the 2001 Peru Shootdown” ABC News, February 3, 2010. 
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released on November 1, 2010, as part of the 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act.286 With the 
release of the final report, it was also revealed that 16 CIA officials, both active duty and retired, 
had faced administrative punishment for their roles in the ABDP.287  Meanwhile, publicly at 
least, the determination of any internal Peruvian investigations is more difficult to ascertain. 
Open press reports at least show that the command pilot of the Peruvian A-37, who had shot 
down OB-1408, was prosecuted by the civil and military justice of Peru.  In both instances he 
was acquitted of any wrongdoing.288  
CONCLUSION 
A historical assessment and analysis of the government documents and press reporting at 
hand clearly demonstrates that during its lifespan in Peru, the ABDP was riddled with lapses in 
protocol, incongruent systems, linguistic challenges, and patterns of errors over years.  What is 
more, counternarcotics cooperation between the U.S. and Peru was challenged by language, 
communications, and protocol barriers even in the lead up to ABDP, which would only be 
amplified during a high-stakes operation that included the downing of aircraft.  Moreover, the 
valid concerns over potential innocent loss of life and legal culpability presented during the 
interruption in intelligence sharing activities in 1994, along with the controversial and bungled 
intercept of the U.S. C-130 by the FAP in 1992 due to coordination breakdowns, foreshadowed a 
program that was inevitably doomed to fail.  The various post-2001 shootdown press reports and 
286	“La CIA castigó a 16 agentes por derribo de avioneta en selva peruana en el 2001,” El Comercio, November 1, 
2010, https://archivo.elcomercio.pe/amp/mundo/actualidad/cia-castigo-16-agentes-derribo-avioneta-selva-peruana-
2001-noticia-662872 
287	See note above.	
288 Angel Paéz, “Peru: CIA y militares discrepan en caso de avión de misioneros,” Inter Press Service, February 9, 
2010, http://www.ipsnoticias.net/2010/02/peru-cia-y-militares-discrepan-en-caso-de-avion-de-misioneros/
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investigations into ABDP consistently highlighted these language barriers, systems limitations, 
misunderstandings or neglect of official protocols and requirements, and a lack of government 
accountability, and made it clear that ABDP had evolved into a program with inherent risks.  
Unfortunately, these risks manifested themselves most seriously in 2001, and as a result Roni 
and Charity Bowers lost their lives.  Certainly, the shootdown of 2001 could be partly attributed 
to a series of tragic events, like problems with weather and radio communications that prohibited 
the earlier filing of a return flight plan by Donaldson.  But the risky patterns that had developed 
over the years of ABDP had become accepted as part of the official operational protocol, 
including the lack of visual warnings, abbreviated and rushed phases of intercept, and the single 
critical communication point, the HNR, who was prone to task saturation.  There simply must be 
more caution in designing and exercising critical oversight for such a high-stakes military air 
interdiction program like ABDP, considering the sensitivity of binational rapid shootdowns of 
unknown civilian aircraft flying close to the border region, and in remote airspace zones with 
frequent communications limitations (such as spotty air traffic control coverage, for example).  
Tragically, ABDP in Peru ultimately failed.  As of the publication of this thesis, the 
program in Peru has been discontinued, even as the U.S. renewed its ABDP cooperation with 
Colombia in August 2003 after additional safeguards were put in place there.289  However, 
various military and government publications, both Peruvian and U.S., continue to highlight 
ABDP as a key success in the fight against narcotrafficking, and maintain that the 2001 
shootdown and civilian deaths were merely a one-off error during a successful program that 
produced positive results over many years.  For example, at Peru’s Centro de Altos Estudios 
Nacionales, Enrique Obando published an article in 2016 claiming the program was “abandoned 
289	U.S. GAO, Drug Control: Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has Implemented New Safeguards, but Its 
Effect on Drug Trafficking Is Not Clear, September 6, 2005, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-970
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by the North Americans due to the accidental shootdown in 2001,” even though the 2001 
shootdown was the “only error in ten years of activity.”290  This is either intentional hyperbole, 
or the failure to recognize the recurring errors and other near misses of ABDP over a period of 
years.  On the U.S. side, there is also a focus on the successes of ABDP in the fight against 
narcotics, and the 2001 incident is still often regarded as an isolated mistake in an otherwise 
effective program, as presented by Ezekiel Parrilla at the U.S. Air Force’s Air University in 
2010.291  In many ways, the same conversations about the necessity of military-led 
counternarcotics interdiction efforts that were had in the 1990s are also now being recycled.  For 
example, Congressmen like Carlos Tubino have championed government efforts to restart air 
interdiction programs in Peru, and they have successfully passed the 2015 Ley No. 30339 and 
recently the 2018 Ley No. 30796, again authorizing air interdictions in Peru by the FAP.292 
Moreover, in justifications of such interdiction programs there is little if any attention given to 
historical errors evident throughout ABDP.  Nor are there guarantees for how such errors would 
be avoided in the future.  The U.S. government, on the other hand, as been hesitant to become 
involved, and as of the writing of this thesis, has yet to agree to reengage in a similar program 
with Peru.293  
290 Enrique Obando, “Drug Trafficking in Peru: forty years later,” Revista Tematica No. 2, Centro de Altos Estudios 
Nacionales, 2016, 31. 
291 Parrilla, Ezekiel. “Airbridge Denial: An interagency and international success story U.S.” United States Air 
University, March 7, 2010. http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/apjinternational/apj-s/2010/2010-
3/2010_03_07_parrilla_eng.pdf. 
292 Government of Peru, Ley No. 30339, Control, Vigilancia y Defensa del Espacio Aéreo Nacional, August 29, 
2015, http://www.leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Documentos/Leyes/30339.pdf, and Ley No. 30796 Que Autoriza La 
Participación De Las Fuerzas Armadas En La Interdicción Contra El Tráfico Ilícito De Drogas En Zonas 
Declaradas En Estado De Emergencia, June 21, 2018, 
http://www.leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Documentos/2016_2021/ADLP/Normas_Legales/30796-LEY.pdf.  
293 Ryan Dube, “Peru Looks to Restart Aerial Interdiction Program, Antidrug Chief Says,” The Wall Street 
Journa, July 11, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/peru-looks-to-restart-aerial-interdiction-program-antidrug-
chief-says-1405102282  
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When ABDP is not hailed as a successful air interdiction program, it is often simply 
neglected in relevant academic literature on the topic, despite the many lessons that could be 
gleaned from its evolution.  In his October 2015 PUCP thesis, “Los planes de Interdicción como 
mecanismo para el control en la lucha contra las drogas ilegales,” William César Santillan Nuñez 
says nothing of ABDP or the historical lessons that could be learned from its development and 
failure.  Additionally, Javier Ernesto Bueno Victoriano’s PUCP Thesis, “Interdicción contra el 
transporte aéreo clandestino de derivados cocaínicos desde los departamentos de la Amazonía 
peruana hacia el extranjero en el period comprendido entre los años 2012 al 2014,” published in 
April 2016, only briefly mentions the ABDP in passing, and says nothing about why the program 
between the U.S. and Peru stopped.  
While this thesis is not searching for policy solutions to counternarcotics programs in 
Peru, nor is it a quantitative analysis of the actual effects like ABDP on the trafficking of coca, 
the point is that any government and academic discussions on the theme should at least consider 
the historical case study of ABDP, including its complex development, inevitably risky 
operations, and subsequent fallout that exposed inconsistencies, as a source of lessons learned 
and acknowledgement of mismanagement in the past.  Only through the consideration of this 
historical perspective, and an analysis of its detailed layers, can similar contemporary policies 
and programs be formed effectively.   
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ABDP – Air Bridge Denial Program  
ABWE – Association of Baptists for World Evangelism 
ADIZ – Air Defense Interdiction Zone 
AWACS – Airborne Warning and Control System  
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency 
DEA – Drug Enforcement Agency 
DoD – Department of Defense  
DoJ – Department of Justice  
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigations 
FAP – Fuerza Aerea del Peru (or Peruvian Air Force) 
FOIA – Freedom of Information Act 
GOP – Government of Peru  
GAO – Government Accountability Office  
HNR – Host Nation Rider  
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ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organization  
ISR – Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
MOJ – Memorandum of Justification  
MTC – Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones (Peruvian Ministry of Transportation and 
Communication) 
USCS – U.S. Customs Service 
ONDCP - Office of National Drug Control Policy 
PD – Presidential Determination 
UHF – Ultra High Frequency  
U.S. – United States of America 
USG – U.S. Government  
VHF – Very High Frequency 
VI RAT – Peruvian VI (6th) Territorial Air Region 
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ncmorandum of JustiCication for  
Presidential Determination Regarding the  
Resumption of U - S .  Aerial Tracking Information Sharing 
and Other Assistance to the Government of Peru 
Section 1012 of the National Defense Authorization A c e  
€or Fiscal Yebr 1995 provides that '[nlotwithstanding a-ny  
other provision of law. i t  shall not be unlawful for  
authorized employees oc agents of a foreign country . . . to 
interdict or attempt to interdict an aircraft in that  
country's territory o r  airspace if- 
(1) that aircraft is reasonably suspected to be  
primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking; and  
(2) the President . . . has determined uith respect 
to that country that-  
(A) interdiction is necessary because of the  
extraordinary threat posed by illicit drug  
trafficking to the national security of that  
country; and  
( 8 )  the country has appropriate pcocedures in 
place to protect again-'se:innocent loss of life in  
the air. anb on the ground ir connection ui:h  
iritetdictioni ufiich.shal1 at a minimum knclude  
effective means to identify and warn an aircraft 
before the use of force directed against the  
aircraft.'  
Narcotics production,and trafficking pose a grave threat  
to eeru's national seculity. Sizty percent of the world's ' 
coca leaf supply is grown east a t  the Andes in Pe'ru. The 
resulting drug trade, qeneratinq billions of dollars of  
illicit profits annually. has undermined the Government of  
Peru's efforts to put the leyitimate Peruvian economy on a  
stable footing d u e t o  the effects of narcodellars o n  the  
biack market economy. Trafficking has also impeded concerted  
efforts to bring legitimate political and agricultural  
development to rural areas, and weakened military and law  
enforcement institutions by narcotits corruption. Above all,  
Peruvian narcotics trafficking organizations have provided 
substantial fundinq to Peruvian tcsrorist organizations. ' 
specifically the Shining Path and KRTA, fueling a' vicious  
guerrilla w a r  which has resulted in cud thirds of the country 
being placed under martial law. and 1eft.thousands dead since  
1980.  
Illegal flights by genera l  aviation aiccr.a€t are the 
lifeline of the traEEickecs' operations. They move narcotics  
and related contraband, such as chemicals, currency, and  
ucapons inca and throuah Peru and they ferry logistical  
supplies,to production sites and stiging areas. In the face  
o f  this threat. the Go~ecnment of Peru lacks the resources t0 
control all o f  its airspace and to respond when trafficker  
sirccaCE land at remote locations outside the effective  
cont rol of the government. nccucd i n q l y .  d r u g  smuqgl in9 
airccaft flaqcrntly defy Peru's sovn.feiqnty. peneCracinc; its  
h t ' C e c s  ~t . . . i l l  srld C l y i l r t ~  €~.cclyci~iaucilou: t i le  country. 
in response Z O  this clear threat to national security,  
the Government Of Peru authorized its Air Force to use force,  
if necessary, ta control narcotics smuggling aircraft over  
its territory. Initiated in early 1991. the policy h a s  
deterred narcotics smuggling flights.  
On May 1, 1 9 9 4 ,  the U.S. Department of Dsfense ceased 
providing real-time intelligence to the Government o'f Peru. 
Based on an interagency legal review. the Department of  
~ustice subsequently advised that U.S. domestic criminal law 
could be interpreted to preclude sharing of intelligence vith  
countries that used this information to shoot down civil ' 
aviation aircraft. The lack of intelligence has severely  
hindered Peru's, efforts to stop the drug production and  
trafficking that threaten i t s  national security. Section 
1012 of u.S.  public Lau 103-337 ( the  1995 National Defense 
Authorization kct) uas enacted specifically to address 'legal  
'concerns relating bo the sharing of intelligence.  
Peruvian decree l r v  no. 25426, dated April 9, 1992, 
contemplates the use of arms again~~~pareotics  trafficking . 
civil aircraft under very restricted conditions and only in a  
specially declared Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)  
comprising Peruvian tcrri'tory east of the crest of the Andes  ... 
mountain chain.  
' The GOP has established rigorous procedures to ensure  
adequate protection against the loss of innocent life. The ' 
procedures for identifying ind.communicating with intercepted  
aircraft arc b a s 6  on ICAO guidelines, and are contained in . 
classified GOP and orders, as well as in Civil Aviation  
law 24882. The procedures are summarized:belOu: 
It is the national policy of Peru that mrco-trafficking  
aircraft are by their nature 'hostile' t o  Peruvian national  
security; the use of weapons against such aircrart in flight  
by the Peruvian Air Force may be authorized under very strict  
conditions after all attempts to identify innocent aircraft  
and to persuade the suspect aircraft to land at a controlled  
airfield have bean exhausted. The U.S. Government knows of 
no instan- in yhich Peruvian A i r  Force aiccract hcve  
deviated f r o m  the procedures described below. Tho COP has 
placed additional conditions and controls on the use of such  
locce -- speciticrlly prohibiting attacks on commercial 
passenger ,aircraft.  
Peru's a i r  interdiction pcocedures arb in four phases:  
. ~denti~ication:The PAT will attempt to identify an 
aircraft as a legitimate flight. This will include  
determining whether the aircraft is on a previously  
filed flight plan and by attempting to establish radio  
comunication with the aircraft. when control centers  
(ground and/or air radars) detect an overflight o f  any  
aircraft, they will attempt to identify it through  
correlation of flight plans and by electronic  
means--through use of IFF or radio communi~ltions.  . Intercept: I£ the PAF determines that an aircraft 
flying in the AD12 is not on a previously approved -
flight plan, and i f  it is not possible to establish 
communication and confirm the aircraft's identification  
as an innocent aircraft, the Commanding General of the  
Peruvian Air Force Sixth Territorial Air Region (VI RAT)  
nay d i ~ e c t  the launch of interce~tpr aircraft to  
visua'lXy identify the aircraft. verify its registry.  
attempt to establish radio contact. and. it necessaty,  
cause the aircraft to proceed to a safe and adequate a i r   
strip where the PAP will require the aircraft to land --
using intercept procedures consistent with International'  
Civil Aviation Ocganiration guidelines.  
If radio communication is established during the  
intercept, but the. PAF is not satisfied that the  
aircraft is on a legitimate mission, the PAF may direct  
th.e aircraft to land at a safe and adequate air strip. 
I£ radio contact is not possible. the PAF pilot must use  
a series of internationally rccoynized procedures to  
make visual contact with the suspect aircraft and to  
direct the aircraft to follow the intercepting aircraft  
to a secure airfield for inspection- ' . . Use of Weapons: If the aircraft continues to ignore the 
internationally recognized instructions to land. the PAF 
pilot -- only after gaining permis'sion, 06 the Commanding 
General ot thr VI RAT or in his absence the Chief of  
Staff -- may fire warning shots in accoidance with 
specified PAF procedures. I f  these are ignored, and  
only after again obtaining the approval of the  
Commanding General of the V I  RAT or in his absence the  
Chief of Staff, the PAF palot may use weapons against 
the trafticking aircraft w i t h  the goal of disabling it.  
Fin-ally, if such tire does not cause the intercepted 
pilot to obey PAP instcuctions. the VI RAT commander ma>' 
order the trrCLickec aicccafc shot down.  
1 The final decision to use force against civil aircraft  
in flight -- once all other steps have been exhausted --
requires authorization from the V I  RAT Comander -- or 
in his absence his Chief of Staff -- who will veriEy 
chat all appropriate procedures have been fulfilled.  
Peruvian air interdiction procedures also pracect  
against innocent loss of life on the ground. The decision to  
tire at an aircraft requires approval of t h e  Commander of the 
Peruvian Air Force Sixth Territorial Air Region -- or his 
Chief of Staff. These procedures do not contemplate the use  
of weapons against  an aircraft flying over a,populated area. 
.The  AD12 in Peru covers areas which are very sparsely 
populated.  
with respect to interceptors firing against trafficking  
aircraft on the ground, the procedures are similar to those  
for an aircraft in flight. When a pilot encounters a suspect  
aircraft on the ground, he must :-:apt to'establish radio  
communication with the arrcraft and employ visual signals  
which arc also observable by any other pcrsons.on the ground  
in the vicinity. Only in response to armed attack or in the  
event that the aircraft attempts to take off after  
communication, identification. and warning procedures have 
been cbmpleted may the VI-RAT commander authorize use of 
weapons to disable the aircraft i f  there is no risk to 
innocent bystanders.  
The Peruvian procedures are designed to identify for  
interception aircraft that are likely to be-engaged in drug  
trafficking and, for airccaft so intercepted, to provide  
proper notice that they arc required to land. These  
procedures minimize the risk of misidentification. Any 
decision to fire on civil aircraft. and the procedures and  
events leading to it, will subsequently be revieved by the  
COP pursuant to legal provisions and sanctions available to  
i t  against any COP official who deviates from established 
p rocedu r e s . 
The VSC and GOP jointly operate all radar facilities and  
the Sixth Territorial Air Region command center  in Peru. 
Peruvian personnel accompany most USG aicborne'trackiog
platfocms ovtrflying Peru. A S  p a r t  of  their standard 
operating instructions, a l l  official USG personnel in jointly  
manned Eacilitiea and platfocms will regularly monitor 
compliance with agreed procedurcs and immediately report  
irregularities through their chain of comnand. Should t h e r e  
be evidence suggesting that procedures are not being  
followed. the USC will r e e v a l u a t e  who:hu.r Peru has 
appropriate proced~~ces  to protcc: apa;lisl: clie Loss of 
innocenc l i ! ? .  
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A Review of United States Assistance to Peruvian Counter-Drug 
Air Interdiction Efforts and the Shootdown of a Civilian Aircraft 
on April 20,200 1 
REPORT 
of the 
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 
UNITED STATES SENATE 
October 2001 
BACKGROUND 
On the morning of April 20,2001, a Peruvian Air Force A-37 fighter engaged in 
counter-drug operations over northeastern Peru fired on and disabled a suspected drug 
trafficking aircraft. Thesingle engine float plane actually was owned and operated by the 
Association of Baptists for World Evangelism and was carrying missionaries returning to 
their homes in Iquitos, Peru. One of the missionaries, Veronica Bowers, and her infant 
daughter Charity were killed by the gunfire. A bullet also hit the pilot, Kevin 
Dondaldson, shattering two bones in his leg. Mrs. Bowers' husband Jim and son Cory 
survived the attack. The damaged float plane made an emergency landing on the Amazon 
River about 80 miles from Iquitos, Peru. The missionary's plane had been tracked by a 
Cessna Citation owned by the US.  military and operated by the US.  Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) as part of a bi-national drug interdiction program. 
NATURE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE'S REVIEW 
The Committee has held one closed hearing and a closed briefing concerning the 
Peru shootdown. On April 24,2001, the Committee heard testimony from George Tenet, 
Director of Central Intelligence. Director Tenet was accompanied by the Chief of the 
CIA's Latin American Division and the Chief of the CIA's Military and Special Programs 
Division. On May 10, Committee members and staff met to view the videotape and 
transcript of the shootdown and were briefed by CIA officials. On July 26, the 
Committee staff received an on-the-record briefing from Assistant Secretary of State 
Rand Beers who summarized the results of the joint h&Can-Pe~vian investigation of 
the shootdown. 
Committee staff conducted interviews with executives and personnel from: the 
CIA, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Customs Service, the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the 
Peruvian Air Force, Peru's aeronautical agency and the Association of Baptists for World 
Evangelism (ABWE). Individuals interviewed included: the American crew of the 
Citation tracker aircraft, Mr. Kevin Donaldson and Mr. James Bowers, and ground 
personnel in Peru. The Peruvian authorities did not permit Committee staff to interview 
the host nation rider, the interceptor pilots, the Peruvian Officer in Charge on the day of 
shootdown, or the Commanding General of the Peruvian Air Force Sixth Territorial Air 
Region who authorized the shootdown. The Peruvians denied the interview request 
because there are pending judicial proceedings against the Peruvian pilots and the host 
nation rider. The Peruvians had made all of the officers available to the joint 
Peruvian/American investigation team. In order to complete their interviews and review 
of relevant evidence, Committee staff traveled to the headquarters of both the U.S. 
Southern Command and the Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF-E), the Peruvian 
cities of Lima, Pulcallpa, and Iquitos and to ABWE Headquarters in Harrisburg, Pa. 
The Committee made oral and written requests to the agencies named above for 
information relevant to the inquiry. Committee staff has been able to review substantial 
material provided by the CIA and smaller but significant amounts of material provided by 
the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the ONDCP. 
The Committee owes a particular debt of gratitude to Mr. Bowers and Mr. 
Donaldson for their willingness to meet with Committee staff and review the events 
leading up to the April 20 tragedy. These two individuals suffered a loss of 
incomprehensible magnitude, yet they recounted the events with clarity and precision 
making an invaluable contribution to the Committee's understanding of this terrible 
episode. Without their cooperation the Committee's work would have been incomplete. 
HISTORY OF THE PROGRAM 
The United States runs a large and multi-pronged counter-drug program in Peru. 
According to officials at the US.  Embassy the program is based on four pillars -
interdiction, eradication, alternative development, and demand reduction. Most, if not all 
sections of the Embassy contribute to this effort. The Drug Enforcement Agency has 
primary responsibility for interdiction efforts through its liaison relationship with the 
Peruvian National Police. The State Department Narcotics Affairs Section supports 
Peruvian manual eradication efforts while the Agency for International Development 
focuses on alternative development. Various elements of the U.S. military also provide 
support to the interdiction effort through training and materiel support. This includes 
efforts to upgrade the Peruvian military's interdiction capabilities.' 
Throughout the cocaine epidemic of the 1980s and into the early 1990s Peru was 
the largest producer of coca leaf, the raw material for cocaine, in the world. In 1992, 
Peruvian cultivation peaked at 129,100 hectares and accounted for 61 percent of the 
world's coca.' Traditionally the coca leaf was refined into cocaine base in Peru before 
being transported to Colombia for final processing and shipment to the world's markets, 
primarily the United States. Given the remoteness of the coca growing areas in the 
Peruvian jungle and the lack of transportation infrastructure, smuggling by air was the 
' SSCI staff interviews with U.S. Embassy Country Team, Lima, Peru, 6/21/01. 
20NDCP Table 1: Net Coca Cultivation. 7120101 













02. Cessna A185E, OB-1408.
Matrícula: OB-1408 Año de fabricación: 1966 Categoría/peso: 2250 Kg o menos
Marca y modelo de la aeronave: Cessna A185 E
Núm. De motores/ marca y modelo: 01/ Teledyne Continental  IO-550-D
Fecha: 20-04-2001 Hora UTC: 15:55 Provincia: Loreto
Lugar del suceso: Localidad de Huanta
Lesiones Muertos Graves Leves/ Iles. Piloto al mando (licencia): Piloto Comercial
Tripulación 01 Edad: 42 Total horas de vuelo: 1135:18
Pasajeros 02 Tipo de operación: RAP 91
Otros 02 Fase de operación: Crucero
Daños a la aeronave: aeronave baleada y quemada Tipo de suceso: Accidente
DESCRIPCIÓN DEL SUCESO
El día 20 de Abril del 2001, la aeronave Cessna A 185E, con matrícula OB-
1408 y perteneciente a la Asociación Bautista de Evangelización Mundial,
partió desde la localidad de Islandia con destino Iquitos. La aeronave se
encontraba operando bajo la RAP parte 91 y llevaba como pasajeros a dos
adultos, un niño y un infante.
Aproximadamente a la altura de la localidad de Pevas la aeronave es
interceptada por una aeronave Cessna A 37B perteneciente a la Fuerza
Aérea del Perú, la cual abrió fuego contra la OB-1408 ocasionándole daños
mayores e incendio a bordo de la aeronave. Como resultado de este suceso
la aeronave es derribada a la altura de la localidad de Huanta, pereciendo
un adulto y un infante, y quedando gravemente herido el piloto.
CONCLUSIONES
Derribo de la aeronave Cessna A 185E, OB-1408 a consecuencia de los
impactos de bala recibidos en zonas vitales del fuselaje; disparos hechos
por el arma General Dynamics GAU-2B/A "minigun" de 7.62 mm, instalada
en la aeronave  interceptora (interdictora) Cessna A-37B de la Fuerza Aérea
del Perú.
Incumplimiento por parte de los tripulantes de la aeronave interceptora
Cessna A-37B y de los organismos involucrados y encargados de la
interceptación de aeronaves dentro del espacio aéreo peruano,
encabezados por la Fuerza Aérea del Perú, de los procedimientos descritos
en el Anexo N° 2, Capitulo 3.8, Apéndice 2 y Anexo A de la Organización de
Aviación Civil Internacional.
Incumplimiento por parte de los tripulantes de la aeronave interceptora
Cessna A-37B y de los organismos involucrados y encargados de la
interceptación de aeronaves dentro del espacio aéreo peruano,
encabezados por la Fuerza Aérea del Perú, de los procedimientos de
interceptación descritos en el manual AIP-PERU.

